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I. INTRODUCTION1
In 2010, large deposits of oil and natural gas were found in the Bakken
shale formation, much of which is encompassed by the Fort Berthold Indian
reservation. Fort Berthold is home to the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Na-
tion (“MHA Nation” or “Three Affiliated Tribes” or “the Tribe”). Accord-
ing to one estimate, in five years the Bakken formation has gone from
producing about 200,000 to 1.1 million barrels of oil a day, making North
Dakota the number two oil-producing state in the United States.2 In fact, the
oil boom has been credited with decreasing the unemployment rate in North
Dakota to 3.2%, one of the lowest in the United States.3 However, rapid oil
and gas development have brought an unprecedented rise of violent crime on
and near the Fort Berthold reservation.4 Specifically, the influx of well-paid
male oil and gas workers, living in temporary housing often referred to as
“man camps,” has coincided with a disturbing increase in sex trafficking of
Native women.5 There has been a dramatic increase in sexual violence
1 The authors wish to thank Rebecca Adamson, Ken Hall, Monte Fox, Tom
Fredericks, Cara Currie Hall, Steven Heim, Susan White, Nick Pelosi, John Fredericks,
Suzanne Benally, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Sarah Deer, Lucille Echohawk, Michael
Johnson, Marilyn Youngbird, Sarah Krakoff, Pat Zerega, and Christina Warner for their
assistance with this publication. Any errors are ours alone.
2 Sari Horwitz, Dark Side of the Boom, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/09/28/dark-side-of-the-boom/ [https://perma.cc/
9S6D-WLCL]; see also North Dakota Annual Oil Production, N.D. OIL & GAS DIV.,
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/annualprod.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JSR-29FM].
3 See Kasia Klimasinka, No Kids, No Booze, No Pets: Inside North Dakota’s Largest
Man Camp, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2013-02-12/no-kids-no-booze-no-pets-inside-north-dakota-s-largest-man-camp
[https://perma.cc/97L8-2YK3].
4 Nikke Alex, Dark Side of Oil Development: Bakken Oil Boom Pumping Sexual
Violence into Fort Berthold Reservation (unpublished paper) (available at Nikke Alex,
Dark Side of Oil Development: Bakken Oil Boom Pumping Sexual Violence into Fort
Berthold Reservation, LAST REAL INDIANS, http://lastrealindians.com/dark-side-of-oil-de-
velopment-bakken-oil-boom-pumping-sexual-violence-into-fort-berthold-reservation-by-
nikke-alex [https://perma.cc/FF9L-66W4]).
5 See Amy Dalrymple and Katherine Lymn, Native American Populations ‘Hugely at
Risk’ to Sex Trafficking, BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Jan. 5, 2015), http://bismarcktribune.com/
bakken/native-american-populations-hugely-at-risk-to-sex-trafficking/article_46511e48-
92c5-11e4-b040-c7db843de94f.html [https://perma.cc/UQU7-NCLS]. Often, ‘man
camps’ are associated with a culture of violence. See Sexual Violence on Oil Field ‘Man
Camps’ Brought to United Nations’ Attention, THE LAKOTA LAW PROJECT (May 26,
2015), https://lakotalawproject.wordpress.com/2015/05/26/sexual-violence-on-oil-field-
man-camps-brought-to-united-nations-attention [http://perma.cc/S89A-NW64]; see also
Alex, supra note 4; Katie Cheney, Rape, Sex Trafficking, and the Bottom Line: Corpora- R
tions’ Complicity in Violence Against Women, FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE (March 5,
2015), http://firstpeoples.org/wp/rape-sex-trafficking-and-the-bottom-line-corporations-
complicity-in-violence-against-women [https://perma.cc/468J-LA2U].
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against women and children and, according to the same report, sexual as-
saults on males on the Fort Berthold reservation have increased by 75%.6
This increase comes at a time when Native women are already more than
twice as likely to experience violent crimes as women as a whole in the
United States.7
The social risks of oil development on American Indian reservations
like Fort Berthold are distinct from those of development in other areas in
the United States.8 The complex and shifting nature of federal Indian law
presents legal and practical challenges to law enforcement in civil and crimi-
nal contexts.9 Federal Indian law requires a jurisdictional analysis that fo-
cuses on the identity of the perpetrator and the land status of the location
where the crime occurred in order to determine which governmental body is
responsible for arrest, detention, and prosecution.10 Further, the historical ex-
ploitation of Indian lands and people informs current social and economic
conditions that contribute to increased sex trafficking of Native women and
children. The combination of these historical and legal dynamics presents
unique challenges as the MHA Nation considers their options to effectively
police and regulate the conduct of non-Native entities on their reservation
and in Indian Country.
This paper begins by describing the intersection of sex trafficking and
oil and gas development on the Fort Berthold reservation. Next, the paper
describes the jurisdictional regime within federal Indian law and other barri-
ers to law enforcement that have created a situation ripe for trafficking and
other crimes on the Fort Berthold reservation.11 Finally, the paper will ex-
amine strategies to address this complex issue, including corporate engage-
ment of relevant companies, tribal capacity and coalition building, cross
deputization, and civil considerations and remedies contained in the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 2014 and the Tribal Law and Order Act of
6 See Damon Buckley, Firsthand Account of Man Camp in North Dakota from Local
Tribal Cop, LAKOTA COUNTRY TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://www.lakotacountrytimes
.com/news/2014-05-22/Front_Page/Firsthand_Account_Of_Man_Camp_In_North_Dako
ta_From.html [https://perma.cc/PM6Z-G26B].
7 See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002 IV, v (2004); cf. NCAI POLICY RE-
SEARCH CENTER, STATISTICS ON VIOLENCE AGAINST NATIVE WOMEN 2 (2013), http://
www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_tWAjznFslemhAffZgNGzHUqIWMRPkCDjpFt
xeKEUVKjubxfpGYK_Policy%20Insights%20Brief_VAWA_020613.pdf [https://perma
.cc/DMN8-HS2E] (American Indians and Alaska Natives are 2.5 times as likely to be
victims of violent crimes, and 2 times more likely to be victims of rape or sexual assault
crimes compared to all other races).
8 See Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or Its Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil
and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 535, 538
(2011).
9 See id. at 547.
10 See id; see also Michael J. Bulzomi, Indian Country and the Tribal Law and Order
Act of 2010, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (2012), https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/may/in-
dian-country-and-the-tribal-law-and-order-act-of-2010 [https://perma.cc/SQC5-5HRA].
11 This paper does not provide an exhaustive account of all civil and criminal reme-
dies available to the MHA Nation.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\40-1\HLG103.txt unknown Seq: 4 14-FEB-17 13:49
4 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 40
2010. This paper asserts that all of the stakeholders involved in oil develop-
ment on the Fort Berthold reservation—federal, state, tribal, and public and
private companies—must work cooperatively to eliminate sex trafficking of
Native women and children decisively.
II. SEX TRAFFICKING, NATIVE WOMEN, AND THE BAKKEN OIL BOOM
The United States government defines sex trafficking in the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”).12 Under the TVPA, “severe
forms of trafficking in persons” are defined as the acts of “recruit[ing],
harboring, transport[ing], provi[ding], or obtaining of a person for labor or
services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of
subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery,” or
“sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act [e.g. prostitution13] is in-
duced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to per-
form such an act has not attained 18 years of age.” 14 This definition tracks
closely with that used in the Palermo Protocols, notably the Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, which the United States ratified in 2001.15 Because of the interplay
of psychological, physical, and emotional abuse, trafficking is often referred
to as modern slavery.16
Under the TVPA, trafficking does not require transporting the victims
from one location to another.17 Victims can be recruited and sold in one
location, or they can be transported to another location.18 The key aspect of
trafficking is the traffickers’ goal to exploit the victim and gain financially at
their expense by using coercive practices such as deception and intimida-
tion.19 Traffickers sometimes require victims to pay off their “debts” that are
purportedly incurred during their work, locking victims in an inescapable
12 See Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7102 (2012)).
13 N.D. Cent. Code. § 12.1-29-03 (2015) (“An adult is guilty of prostitution . . . if the
adult: [i]s an inmate of a house of prostitution or is otherwise engaged in sexual activity
as a business; [s]olicits another person with the intention of being hired to engage in
sexual activity; or [a]grees to engage in sexual activity with another for money or other
items of pecuniary value.”); see also Amanda Peters, Modern Prostitution Legal Reform
& the Return of Volitional Consent, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 (2015) (discussing Safe Harbor
laws regarding prostitution).
14 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2012) (emphasis added).
15 UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, Art. 3(a), 12 Nov. 2000, http://www.refworld
.org/docid/4720706c0.html [https://perma.cc/8THK-UU6M].
16 See, e.g., Letter from Secretary Kerr: Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. DEP’T. OF
STATE (2013), http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/210540.htm [https://perma.cc/
AM47-HSES].
17 See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2013), http://www
.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/210543.htm [https://perma.cc/KWZ3-AWL9].
18 See id.
19 See id. at 29.
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cycle of debt and repayment controlled by the trafficker.20 Importantly, a
victim held through psychological manipulation or physical force is still
considered a victim of sex trafficking regardless of whether he or she ini-
tially consented to engaging in a commercial sex act.21
Native victims of sex trafficking often have several overlapping risk
factors, including exposure to domestic violence, sexual assault, and pov-
erty.22 Many times those who are trafficked are already victims of sexual,
racial, and economic exploitation.23 According to a report completed in
1999, the rate of sexual assault and rape of Native American women was
seven per one thousand women versus two for white women and three for
African American women.24 Many scholars and activists have written exten-
sively on the cumulative impact of colonial violence against Native Ameri-
can people–Native women specifically–and its sanctioning of violence
against Native women.25 This generational and historical trauma along with
high incidences of poverty, depression, homelessness, and substance abuse
in Native communities make Native women and children26 extremely vulner-
able to trafficking.27 Where socioeconomic inequality is a major facilitator of
entry into the sex trade,28 it is no surprise that the rapid increase of wealth
near the relatively poorer communities on the Fort Berthold reservation has
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See MELISSA FARLEY ET AL., MINNESOTA INDIAN WOMEN’S SEXUAL ASSAULT
COAL. & PROSTITUTION RESEARCH & EDUC. CTR., GARDEN OF TRUTH: THE PROSTITU-
TION AND TRAFFICKING OF NATIVE WOMEN IN MINNESOTA 3 (2011), http://www.prostitu-
tionresearch.com/pdfs/Garden_of_Truth_Final_Project_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3RAK-9Y7Z].
23 See id. at 4.
24 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 173386, AMERICAN
INDIANS AND CRIME 3 (1999), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf [https://perma
.cc/MBU6-PHGN].
25 See generally, e.g., Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native
Women in the United States, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 622–26 (2010) (discussing
the history of sex trafficking of Native Americans in colonial America and its lasting
effects); Benjamin Thomas Greer, Hiding Behind Tribal Sovereignty: Rooting Out
Human Trafficking in Indian Country, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 453 (2013) (examin-
ing the characteristics of Native American culture and history in California that make
Native Americans particularly vulnerable to human trafficking); Native Women: Protect-
ing, Shielding, and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, and Daughters: Oversight Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 70–75 (2011) (statement of
Professor Sarah Deer) (asserting that systemic abuse throughout US history has led to
many of the problems Native Americans experience today).
26 While the effect of trafficking on child welfare is the subject of further inquiry, see
Farley, et al., supra note 22, at 39 (describing the high rate of drug use among Native R
women being trafficked to manipulate them to continue to be prostituted, and the high
rate of childhood sexual abuse among trafficking survivors).
27 See generally Farley, et al., supra note 22. R
28 See generally ALEXANDRA PIERCE, SHATTERED HEARTS: THE COMMERCIAL SEX-
UAL EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN AND GIRLS IN MINNESOTA, MINNESOTA
INDIAN WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTER (2009), https://www.miwrc.org/graphics/reports/
Shattered-Hearts-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLP7-TU3T] (describing economically coer-
cive methods of convincing women to enter the sex trade and reporting statistics of wo-
men exchanging sex for shelter, food, or transportation).
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created a dangerous situation ripe for exploitation of the Native women and
children living there for economic gain.
Though general awareness is growing, there has been very little empiri-
cal work done specifically regarding trafficking of Native women and chil-
dren in the United States from which to build prevention efforts. Reports
completed with Native survivors of trafficking and sexual violence in Min-
nesota and Alaska provide some insight into the unique nature of Native
women’s experiences being trafficked for sex.29 The exact identity of traf-
fickers and those paying for services is not well known, but several reports
indicate that in the majority of cases, sexual violence against Native women
is by non-Native perpetrators.30 Traffickers often “groom” victims, posing as
intimate partners, and use incentives such as emotional intimacy and
promises of financial independence to gain trust.31 They then use that rela-
tionship to engage victims in commercial sex work. Thus, while more data is
needed, it is clear that the women and children on the Fort Berthold reserva-
tion are at a higher risk of exploitation by relatively well-paid oil and gas
workers who are only temporary residents in this community.
Importantly, the link between violence against indigenous women and
the entrance of the extractive industries has only recently been recognized.
More data needs to be developed around the impact of resource development
on local criminal justice departments. As a result of missing or incomplete
crime data, investigators use alternative methods to research crime.32 These
methods may include surveys, focus groups, and interviews of community
members, police officers, other service providers, and representatives of oil
and gas companies.33 The U.S. State Department recently published a report
stating that the influx of industry workers creates a higher demand for the
commercial sex industry.34 The report notes that, “[a]ny discovery of raw
materials will necessarily lead to a large influx of workers and other individ-
29 See generally Farley et al., supra note 22 (using conversations with women at a R
women’s shelter to understand the impacts of historical trauma, racism, addiction, and
other risk factors that contribute to the high rates of trafficking of Native women).
30 See Farley et al., supra note 22, at 27 (noting that Native survivors reported that the R
majority of men who bought them were “White European-American (78%) or African
American (65%) but also Latino (44%), Native American (24%), or . . . Asian (9%)”);
RONET BACHMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN
AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN
38 (2008) (noting that 67% of Native women victims of rape or sexual assault describe
the offender as non-Native). This is a disturbing pattern of trafficking that bears on the
MHA Nation’s ability to enforce its laws strongly against both Native and non-Native
perpetrators.
31 See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2013), supra note
17, at 9. R
32 See Rick Ruddell, Dheeshana S. Jaysundara, Roni Mayzer & Thomasine Heitkamp,
Drilling Down: An Examination of the Boom-Crime Relationship in Resource Based
Boom Counties, 15 WESTERN CRIMINOLOGY REV. 3, 11 (2014).
33 See id.
34 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE LINK BETWEEN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND SEX
TRAFFICKING (2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245377.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FL5Q-CHR6].
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uals, some of whom will create a demand for the commercial sex indus-
try.”35 The report specifically notes exploitation of Native women in the
Bakken region and decries the fact that, “sex trafficking related to extractive
industries often occurs with impunity.”36
A. The Intersection of Sex Trafficking and the Extractive Industries on
the Fort Berthold Reservation
Fort Berthold encompasses nearly one million acres and is home to over
4000 people.37 The reservation is divided into six segments, where each seg-
ment elects a representative to the Tribal Business Council.38 The Business
Council, overseen by the Chairman, governs all aspects of the reservation
pursuant to their power under the Constitution and by-laws of the Three
Affiliated Tribes.39 The Business Council has overseen all aspects of oil and
gas development on the reservation, including its side effects such as the
increased need for road maintenance, long-term planning, and increased reg-
ulatory oversight over leasing.40 Notably, the Tribal Business Council passed
a resolution in December of 2014 to prevent human trafficking and to ap-
prove the tribal Human Trafficking Code, called Loren’s Law.41 Furthermore,
the Council called for a panel on public safety during the Indigenous Nations
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Fort Berthold Agency, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www
.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/GreatPlains/WeAre/Agencies/FortBerthold/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/B87N-44H8].
38 MHA Nation Elected Officials, MHA NATION, http://www.mhanation.com/main2/
elected_officials.html [https://perma.cc/2QM4-5S6Y].
39 The Business Council’s authority is noted at the beginning of all Resolutions and
states, “Whereas, Article II of the Constitution of the Three Affiliated Tribes provides
that the Tribal Business Council is the governing body of the Tribes; and, Whereas, the
Constitution of the Three Affiliated Tribes authorizes and empowers the Tribal Business
Council to engage in activities on behalf of and in the interest of the welfare and benefit
of the Tribes and of the enrolled members thereof. . . .” See, e.g., Res. No. 16-001-LKH,
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/elected_officials/elected_officials_resolutions/resolu-
tions_2016/01-14-19-2016_Resolutions_16-001-LKH-16-020-LKH.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5R7Y-MWZG].
40 MHA Nation Tribal Business Council Res. No. 16-207-LHK, http://www.mhana-
tion.com/main2/elected_officials/elected_officials_resolutions/resolutions_2016/09-22-
2016_Resolutions_16-206-LKH-16-240-LKH.pdf [https://perma.cc/73SD-Z7VT] (ap-
proving the process to receive bids to improve a road impacted by energy development);
see also MHA Energy Division Resolutions, MHA NATION, http://www.mhanation.com/
main2/departments/mha_energy_division/mhaenergydivision_resolutions.html [https://
perma.cc/ND7Y-4UW9 ] (providing a list of Business Council Resolutions relevant to
energy regulation on Fort Berthold).
41 See Loren’s Laws, MHA NATION, http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/
Home_News_2014/News_2014_09_September/Human%20Trafficking%20Code%20Fi
nal%20Draft.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z7D8-QEY6]; see also THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES TRI-
BAL BUSINESS COUNCIL, REGULAR MEETING NO. 14-02-MF 15 (2014), http://www.mha
nation.com/main2/elected_officials/December%2005,%202014%20Meeting.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E7YM-PVDK] (noting the passage of the Resolution instituting Loren’s Law).
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Economic Development Summit on November 16, 2015 to discuss violent
crime related to oil and gas drilling.42
A study focused on counties in Montana and North Dakota noted that
many law enforcement agencies in “resource-based boom communities”
face challenges in responding to an increased number of calls for service.43
Most rural communities do not have the infrastructure, leadership capacity,
or expertise to respond to the rapid social changes and population growth.44
Consequently, local resources are drained dealing with “crime, substance
abuse, health problems and the stress placed on human service organizations
and public services due to increased demand for services and an insufficient
capacity to meet those demands.”45 Further, crime rates in the Bakken are
still rising, and the number of people charged in federal court in Western
North Dakota rose 31% in 2013 alone.46 This crime rate is almost double the
number of criminal defendants charged in 2011.47
Although there is no publicly available comprehensive data collection
process in place on the reservation as of this publication, people on the Fort
Berthold reservation report feeling unsafe given the rise in violent crime.
Recently, the tribe posted a news release alerting the community that four
men had attempted to abduct an eighteen-year-old girl while she was run-
ning on the track of a local elementary school.48 She reported that two men
followed her on foot, while two more followed in a van. It was only after she
reached her uncle’s house that the men left. Another recent news article de-
scribes the plight of a Native American domestic violence victim left in Val-
ley City, N.D. who was then abducted and transported to the Bakken oil
patch as part of a human trafficking operation.49 The MHA Nation’s drug
42 See INDIGENOUS NATIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUMMIT, NURTURING, PRO-
TECTING, AND SAFEGUARDING OUR RESOURCES (2015), http://www.mhanation.com/main
2/Home_Events/Events_2015/11_November%202015/Indigenous%20Nations%20Econo
mic%20Development%20Summit%20Nov%2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BW5-YUL
8] (noting that Blue Campaign, a collaborative effort of federal agencies led by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security to combat trafficking, presented during a session on
public safety).
43 See Ruddell, Jaysundara, Mayzer & Heitkamp, supra note 32, at 4. R
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 5 (citing Mike Nowatzi, Criminal Defendants in Fed Court Up 3 Percent
in Western N.D. in 2013, WDAY NEWS (2014), http://legacy.wday.com/event/article/id/
92257/ [https://perma.cc/SC4Z-7FFC]).
47 See id.
48 Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation Tribal Business Council, COMMUNITY
ALERT, Nov. 18, 2015, as seen on Facebook at Fort Berthold Safety Watch, https://www
.facebook.com/MandareeSafetyWatch/photos/a.551866541532439.1073741824.4153111
28521315/1001679843217771/?type=3&theater [https://perma.cc/4HHN-NQM7].
49 Marshall Helmberger & Jodi Summit, North Dakota Nightmare, TIMBERJAY (May
3, 2015), http://timberjay.com/detail.html?sub_id=12122 [http://perma.cc/6JW2-77M
L]; see also Zoe Sullivan, Crimes Against Native American Women Raise Questions
About Police Response, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jan/19/minnesota-native-american-women-trafficking-police [https://perma.cc/2YP
6-5LVZ] (referencing Edith Chavez).
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treatment center is “overwhelmed by calls” and does not have the capacity
to treat the influx of people who want and need help.50 Senator Heitkamp
believes the increase in substance abuse on the MHA Nation is directly asso-
ciated with the rise of the extractive industries in the Bakken.51 Studies in-
volving the police and human service agents in the Bakken region
discovered that the number of cases of domestic violence was growing.52
Thirty-three percent of police officers interviewed in the Bakken region re-
ported that community members changed their behavior because they were
fearful of crime.53 For these reasons, the MHA Nation, the federal and state
governments, and the oil and gas industry must work cooperatively to pro-
tect Native women and children on and near the Fort Berthold reservation.
At the most basic level, there are not enough officers to police effec-
tively the vast stretches of the reservation. In 2014, the MHA nation had
fewer than twenty tribal officers to cover the nearly one million acres of
rural land.54 These statistics demonstrate that, even now, MHA law enforce-
ment does not have the jurisdiction or capacity to address this burgeoning
problem, along with the traffic violations and regulatory issues that have
increased with development. Further complicating this issue, even with in-
creased training and awareness among law enforcement, trafficking “thrives
on secrecy and operates in the shadows.”55 Traffickers seek out vulnerable
individuals and locate their operations where they know they are least likely
to be caught and most likely to make a profit.56 Traffickers have increasingly
turned to the Internet to sell women and children and to connect to “johns”
without being caught.57 Thus with the combination of economic hardship, an
influx of temporary workers, historical violence against Native women, a
lack of law enforcement resources, and increased oil and gas development,
Fort Berthold has become the perfect place for this heinous crime.
While the MHA Nation desires to protect its community by preventing
trafficking and holding offenders accountable, the limits imposed by federal
50 Caroline Grueskin, Heitkamp Tours Treatment Center in MHA Nation, BISMARCK
TRIBUNE (May 5, 2016), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/heitkamp-
tours-treatment-center-in-mha-nation/article_1bbfe329-3e20-59f3-9e5a-5fa877e339de
.html [https://perma.cc/QLZ7-KSSB].
51 Id.
52 See Ruddell, Jaysundara, Mayzer & Heitkamp, supra note 32, at 5. R
53 See id.
54 See Horwitz, supra note 2. R
55 Greer, supra note 25, at 481. R
56 See id. at 477–78.
57 Cf. Press Release, U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill, Highlighting Impact on Mis-
souri, McCaskill Targets Sex Trafficking & Demands Answers from Backpage.com in
Bipartisan Investigative Hearing (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/me-
dia-center/news-releases/highlighting-impact-on-missouri-mccaskill-targets-sex-traffick-
ing-and-demands-answers-from-backpagecom-in-bipartisan-investigative-hearing [https:/
/perma.cc/R5XZ-G2U7] (describing Senate subcommittee hearing documenting presence
of trafficking ads on Backpage.com, calling for increased regulation to police this and
similar sites, and noting that the “majority of children who are sold for sex in the United
States” are trafficked through Backpage.com).
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Indian law restrain its ability to act decisively and effectively. It is also con-
strained by funding and other practical considerations, including the need to
retain the economic benefits of on-reservation development. Section II of
this paper canvasses the bounds and limits on the MHA Nation under federal
Indian law. It also discusses the capacity of the tribe to work on this issue.
Section III then turns to the various opportunities available to all stakehold-
ers to eliminate sex trafficking of Native women and children on the Fort
Berthold reservation.
III. OBSTACLES TO CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Indian tribes were strong, independent sovereign communities prior to
the erosion of their powers through legal and political conflict with the
United States.58 Through treaties with various tribes, the United States once
acknowledged tribal authority to punish non-Indians for their conduct on
Indian land.59 As the United States expanded west, conflict between settlers,
land speculators, and tribes led to a string of court decisions and legislation
that restricted that power.60 Early court decisions labeled the tribes “domes-
tic dependent nations” subject to the authority of the federal government,
while still affirming the status of the tribes as sovereign nations.61 In his
foundational opinion, Justice Marshall wrote,
The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means ‘a peo-
ple distinct from others.’ The [C]onstitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law
of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with
the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among
those powers who are capable of making treaties.62
Tribal authority to impose and enforce criminal laws has steadily eroded
across the course of U.S. history, largely due to the fluctuating policy posi-
tions taken by Congress. And while Congress has, in recent years, passed
laws to restore limited power to the tribes, the tribes remain largely power-
less to prosecute most criminal activity committed by non-Indians on their
lands.63
58 See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84
N.C. L. REV. 779, 790 (2006).
59 See Treaty of Greenville, U.S.-Wyandot, art. 6, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49.
60 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 785, 791–94. R
61 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831).
62 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
63 See discussion infra Section III (A)(I).
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1. The Indian Country Crimes Act
In their earliest interactions after the establishment of the United States,
the federal government engaged with the tribes as sovereign powers, enter-
ing into formal treaties that established how the two sovereign governments
would interact.64 But as time progressed, aggressive settlers encroached on
Native landholdings, and the federal government was swayed by settlers’
increasing political power.65 Congress then passed the Indian Country
Crimes Act of 1834 (“ICCA”).66 The ICCA extended federal jurisdiction
over crimes between Indians and non-Indians in Indian country.67 Indian
country, defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, includes: (a) “all land within the
. . . reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,” (b)
all “dependent Indian communities,” and (c) “all Indian allotments, the In-
dian titles to which have not been extinguished.”68 The law was limited in
that it left the tribes with some control over their members.69 It allowed
tribes to punish Indians who committed crimes against other Indians on In-
dian lands, or where a treaty had otherwise given the particular tribe exclu-
sive jurisdiction.70 The federal government, by exempting Indian offenders
whom the tribal government had tried and punished, ensured that the tribes
retained concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians.71 But
even within this context, the federal government indicated a lack of trust in
tribes to prosecute fairly non-Indians who committed criminal violations on
their lands.72 The exercise of federal jurisdiction was dependent upon the
interracial nature of the crime because prosecution turned on whether the
perpetrator and/or victim were Indian or non-Indian.73 Even today, unless the
crime falls within another federal statute, such as the Major Crimes Act,
crimes between an Indian defendant and Indian victim remain within the
exclusive control of the tribal government and may not be tried in federal
64 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 791. R
65 See id. at 794.
66 See id. at 793.
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); see also Washburn, supra note 58, at 792–93 R
(describing that the ICCA expanded federal jurisdiction to prosecute Indians who com-
mitted crimes against non-Indians on Indian lands, where previously tribes were able to
punish any offender who committed a crime on their lands.)
68 Id. § 1151; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.02[1][b], 731–32
(2005).
69 See id. § 1152.
70 See id.
71 See N.D. LEG. COUNCIL STAFF, BUDGET COMM. ON HUMAN SERVS., INDIAN JURIS-
DICTIONAL ISSUES 1 (2004), http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/committee-memoran-
dum/59215.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7J3-AD9H].
72 See generally Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Non-
members in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2004) (noting that the U.S.
government’s historic lack of trust of tribal courts to fairly prosecute non-Indian offenders
is based on the erroneous assumption that the tribal court will necessarily be unfair to
outsiders).
73 See COHEN, supra note 68, at § 9.02[1][c], 743. R
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court.74 A crime between a non-Indian defendant and a non-Indian victim is
also excluded from federal coverage because, as decided through common
law, a completely non-Indian crime falls under state jurisdiction.75
2. The Major Crimes Act
As expansion continued throughout the 1800s, settlers and states began
to encroach on Indian country and desired more control therein.76 United
States policy shifted to removal of Indians from their ancestral lands to res-
ervations west of the Mississippi.77 Although many tribes lost a significant
amount of their population due to strenuous travel and sickness, they re-
mained governed by their traditional leadership structures and had near-ex-
clusive jurisdiction over their lands.78. In 1871, Congress actualized a major
policy change and declared that “no Indian nation or tribe within the terri-
tory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an inde-
pendent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract
by treaty.”79 Congress, often viewing the tribes as uncivilized, and with few
real checks on its power, freely enacted legislation designed to destroy tribes
and to assimilate Native individuals into American society.80
The Supreme Court did not adopt such a radical, limiting policy and in
fact, in 1883, ruled in Ex Parte Crow Dog that the United States did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute an Indian for the on-reservation murder of another
Indian.81 The Court referred explicitly to the provisions of ICCA.82 This pre-
served tribes’ ability to maintain order over their lands as to their members,
though the tribes’ success was short lived.
Fearful that tribes would fail to prosecute crimes or to impose substan-
tial punishments, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) in
1885.83 The MCA “federalized prosecutions of serious crimes between Indi-
74 See id.
75 See id. at § 9.02[2][b]–[c], 743–44; see also United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
76 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 794; see also 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 682–83 R
(1823) (detailing ideals of Manifest Destiny and expansion of U.S. territory to the Pa-
cific); cf. H.R. Doc. No. 19-213 at 6, 9–10 (1826) (describing in a report to Congress
military ventures to mark the settlement of the Pacific Northwest).
77 See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 164–66 (2002).
78 See id. at 169–70.
79 Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2012)); see also Clinton, supra note 77, at 167–70 (describing historical underpinnings R
and impacts of federal policy changes leading to the passage of the 1871 Act).
80 Cf. Clinton, supra note 77, at 179 (noting the General Allotment Act of 1887 and R
the development of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and missionary boarding schools as “the
two most important federal initiatives developed during this period to undermine tribal
existence and to forcibly and involuntarily assimilate Indians into American society”).
81 See Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 571
(1883).
82 See id.
83 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 803. R
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ans on reservations,” a subject that had previously been considered an exclu-
sive matter for internal tribal governance.84 In effect, this Act greatly
infringed on the sovereign powers of Indian tribal governments and was an
incredible expansion of federal authority over Indian tribes and people.85 The
MCA did not strip the tribes of jurisdiction over crimes between members,
but gave the federal government concurrent jurisdiction over a specific list
of enumerated violent crimes, including manslaughter, kidnapping, maim-
ing, incest, assault against those under 16 years of age, and felony child
abuse or neglect, among others.86 In order for the MCA to apply, four funda-
mental elements must exist.87 The MCA applies when (1) “an Indian . . .
commit[s],” (2) “against the person or property of another Indian or other
person,” (3) “any of the [enumerated] offenses,” (4) “within the Indian
country.”88 Although the MCA “created federal jurisdiction over certain
enumerated serious felonies by Indians,” it did not revoke the tribes’ author-
ity to punish Indians for crimes listed in the MCA.89 As a result, if both the
defendant and victim were Indian, both the tribal government and the U.S.
federal government would have jurisdiction over the particular list of crimes.
Though the MCA confers federal jurisdiction for prosecution and punish-
ment for certain heinous crimes, it was effectuated at a time of large land
cessions by tribes and subsequent increased dependence on the federal gov-
ernment for goods and services.90 The MCA was an extension of federal
authority “over a subjugated people at the time of their greatest weakness
and political dependence on the United States,” made without consent and
without any sort of democratic engagement with the tribes.91 In upholding
this authority over the tribes, the Supreme Court recognized that the United
States has a “duty of protection” toward the Indians, and from this duty
arises “the power” to exercise criminal jurisdiction.92
In addition to the MCA, the Assimilative Crimes Act, now codified as
18 U.S.C. § 13, provides that “[w]hoever . . . is guilty of any act or omis-
sion which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress,
would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the
State, Territory, Possession, or District . . . shall be guilty of a like offense
and subject to a like punishment.”93 The effect of the MCA and the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act was to extend federal jurisdiction to almost all crimes
84 Id. at 783.
85 See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT AND AMERICAN INDIANS VOL. II 679 (1984).
86 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
87 COHEN, supra note 68, at § 9.02[2][b]. R
88 Id.
89 N.D. LEG. COUNCIL STAFF, supra note 71, at 1. R
90 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 795–96. R
91 Id. at 809.
92 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
93 Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Trial Law and
Order Act of 2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 151 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
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committed in Indian Country, with the exception of a few judicial carve-
outs.94 Again, the explicit policy of the federal government was to assimilate
individuals, and eliminate tribes, while still accepting, to a limited degree,
their responsibility as trustee.95 As a result, the policies of assimilation
worked to weaken tribal government by placing the most serious crimes
under federal jurisdiction.96
With the hope that homesteading and farming would speed Native peo-
ple to adopting the agrarian ideal enforced in U.S. policy, Congress passed
the General Allotment Act of 1887.97 The Allotment Act assigned portions
of the reservation land to individual Indians and allowed the surplus land
from the former reservations to be opened for non-Indian settlement.98 There
was no provision for tribal consent,99 and tribes ceased to hold the large
tracts of land they had been promised by the federal government.100 The Act
provided that the trust relationship between the individual Indian landowners
and federal government expired after twenty-five years.101 The effect of the
Allotment Act, which some have referred to as the “most disastrous piece of
Indian legislation in United States history,”102 was to divest tribes of their
land base and allow significant land holdings by non-Indians in Indian
Country. The Allotment Act resulted in a “checkerboard” pattern of land
ownership.103 This checker-boarded land ownership created a convoluted ju-
risdiction scheme between federal, state, and tribal governments that contin-
ues to trouble Indian country to this day.104
By 1934, Congress had moved away from allotment policies and intro-
duced the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).105 The IRA put an end to the
allotment and assimilation policies and encouraged tribes to adopt formal
constitutions—subject to review and approval by the Secretary of the Inte-
94 Hart, supra note 93. R
95 See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995); see
also Washburn, supra note 58, at 804–05 (describing that a key motive in enacting the R
MCA was the federal policy of assimilation of Indian individuals into majority society).
96 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 798. R
97 See Carla F. Fredericks, Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV., 789, 791–92 (2015)
(citing D.S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 506 (Francis
Paul Prucha ed., 1973)).
98 See Royster, supra note 95, at 9. R
99 William Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 22 (5th ed. 2009).
100 See OTIS, supra note 97, at 13. R
101 See 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2012); see also Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Juris-
diction Over Matters Arising in Indian Country: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction
Among Tribal, State and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973, 981 (2000).
102 CANBY, supra note 99, at 21–24. R
103 Id. at 24; cf. Royster, supra note 95, at 13 (discussing the purposes and effects of R
the Allotment Act).
104 See generally Royster, supra note 95 (discussing the role played by the Allotment R
Act in the history of Indian law jurisdiction and its lasting impact).
105 See Act of June 18, 1934, 28 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461–494 (2012)); see also Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV.
775, 806 (2014).
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rior—and restructure their governments.106 By providing structure, the IRA
ultimately strengthened tribal institutions, including tribal courts.107 While
this supported tribal governments’ ability to engage with the U.S., it compli-
cated internal matters by encouraging tribes to create governments that left
behind traditional cultural institutions and values.108
3. Public Law 280
Due to the U.S. federal government and BIA mismanagement in the
1930s and 40s, numerous reservations had horrible living conditions and
many tribes lived in extreme poverty.109 The U.S. federal government be-
lieved some tribes were ready to be assimilated into American society and
would be better off independent of the BIA.110 Consequently, Congress be-
gan its termination policy in the early 1950s, under which it formally re-
voked federal recognition of certain tribes.111 In effect, “[w]hen Congress
‘terminated’ the federal relationship with a tribe, the federal government lost
federal criminal authority, and jurisdiction over the affected Indian people
devolved to the states.”112 In the early 1950s Congress believed law enforce-
ment and judicial services in Indian country to be inadequate.113 To help
resolve this perceived problem, Congress unilaterally and without tribal con-
sent passed Public Law 280 (PL-280) in 1953.114 This “hallmark” Act of the
termination era drastically altered criminal jurisdiction in some states and
transferred jurisdiction from federal governments to certain state govern-
ments.115 Conforming with the general policy of termination, PL-280 de-
creased federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.116 Significantly, PL-
280 granted states greater authority than what the federal government had
enjoyed.117 The statute provided:
“Each of the States or Territories listed . . . shall have jurisdiction
over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of In-
106 See Singel, supra note 105, at 806–07. R
107 See id. at 816–17.
108 David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, Robert A. Williams Jr. and Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 196 (6th ed, 2011).
109 Cf. History and Culture: Termination Policy – 1953–1968, AMERICAN INDIAN RE-
LIEF COUNCIL, http://www.nrcprograms.org/site/PageServer?pagename=airc_hist_termi
nationpolicy [https://perma.cc/2UCW-Q4XH] (noting that a 1943 survey found Indian
reservation living conditions to be “horrific” and in “extreme poverty”).
110 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 811–12. R
111 Id.
112 Id. at 812.
113 See N.D. LEG. COUNCIL STAFF, supra note 71, at 1. R
114 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 813–14. R
115 See generally CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL
SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997) (discussing the impact of Public Law 280 on
tribal powers, and how that legacy continues today).
116 See id. at 48.
117 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 813. R
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dian country . . . to the same extent that such State or Territory has
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or
Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State or Territory.”118
Under this Act, states could “enforce virtually all of their criminal laws,
including misdemeanors.”119 Consequently, PL-280 proved to be “an even
more aggressive encroachment on tribal sovereignty than . . . the existing
federal system” had been.120 In effect, Congress required six states to assume
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country.121 Furthermore it pro-
vided that the ICCA and the MCA did not apply within those areas of Indian
country.122 Congress “also authorized other states to voluntarily opt to as-
sume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country.”123 In states that
voluntarily opted in, the federal and state governments would share concur-
rent jurisdiction, and where applicable, tribes might have concurrent juris-
diction as well.124 As states took over many of the functions formerly
performed by the federal government, many adverse consequences ap-
peared.125 The affected states were required to provide services without fund-
ing from the federal government, and so states began to see the Acts as
“unfunded mandates.”126 Termination and PL-280 left Native people
“poorly served” and the Act caused civil rights issues to flare.127
North Dakota was one of the states that voluntarily opted into the PL-
280 regime.128 However, a later state amendment required tribal consent for
the state to assume jurisdiction over Indian country land in the state.129 As a
result of this amendment, North Dakota is no longer a Public Law 280
state.130
4. The Indian Civil Rights Act
At the close of the termination era, Indian activists took highly visible
stands for the rights of tribes and tribal members.131 As the self-determina-
tion era began, one of the critical issues was the lack of quality federal law
118 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012).
119 Washburn, supra note 58, at 813. R
120 Id.
121 See N.D. LEG. COUNCIL STAFF, supra note 71, at 1. R
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
125 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 815. R
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF FOR THE BUDGET COMM. ON HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 71, at 1–2. R
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 816. R
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enforcement and criminal justice on Indian land—issues brought to the at-
tention of the government by tribes.132 In fact, “U.S. Attorneys, unlike state
prosecutors, typically decline[d] to prosecute in a far greater percentage of
cases. . . . [This resulted] in the underenforcement of criminal laws in Indian
Country.”133 As a result, self-determination policies “bolstered the role of
tribes as integral participants in the nation’s federal system.”134 Ushering in
the self-determination era was an act that “gave voice to concerns of civil
rights activists.”135
The Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), passed in 1968, provided Indi-
ans with protections similar to those listed in the Bill of Rights.136 Despite
the fact that the adoption of the ICRA was a clear rejection of termination
and endorsement of “the continued existence of tribal governments,” it was
also a significant imposition.137 When passing the ICRA in 1968, Congress
included restrictions that prevented tribes from imposing long sentences or
large fines.138 Showing a distrust of tribal courts, the ICRA limited tribal
court sentences to “six months of imprisonment and a $500 fine.”139 In 1986
those limits were raised to one year of imprisonment and a fine of up to
$5000.140
The ICRA was again amended in 2010 to extend sentencing abilities of
tribes.141 As amended, the ICRA provides that tribes may sentence a defen-
dant to imprisonment for up to three years for any one offense and fine them
up to $15,000.142 This extended sentencing applies to a defendant who
(1) “Has been previously convicted of the same or a comparable
offense by any jurisdiction of the US or
(2) Is being prosecuted for an offense comparable to an offense
that would be punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment
if prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.”143
Importantly, the ICRA was amended in 2010 by passage of the Tribal Law
and Order Act (“TLOA”), which requires tribes to take several steps to en-
132 See id. at 818.
133 Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 963
(2002).
134 Singel, supra note 105, at 816. The Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), Pub. L. R
No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5144 (2012), is one
example of legislation that provided opportunities for Tribes to re-establish tribal govern-
ment and exert leadership over tribal affairs.
135 Washburn, supra note 58, at 816. R
136 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302–1304 (2012).
137 Washburn, supra note 58, at 817. R
138 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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hance their capacity before implementing enhanced sentencing.144 Without
these enhanced measures, Congress effectively limited the jurisdiction of tri-
bal courts to petty misdemeanors and made felony jurisdiction under the
MCA exclusive to the federal government.145
At the same time, the ICRA incorporated a majority of criminal proce-
dural rights found in the Bill of Rights.146 These rights include warrant re-
quirements and the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
prohibition of double jeopardy, prohibition of compelled self-incrimination,
and the prohibition of deprivations of life, liberty or property without due
process.147 Furthermore, to meet the requirements of the Act, the tribe must
guarantee access to licensed defense counsel, provide a judge with legal
training and a license to practice law, and make its criminal laws publicly
available.148 In theory, the ICRA was intended to address concerns that de-
fendants would face trial without basic due process rights by extending cer-
tain basic procedural rights to anyone tried in tribal court.149 Further, the
ICRA confers a federal habeas right to defendants who claim their rights
have been violated.150
If the federal interest in restricting tribal criminal jurisdiction and sen-
tencing is to ensure that defendants have a fair trial, the rights provided
through the ICRA substantially alleviate such concerns.151 Although the
ICRA provides defendants with additional protection, the prevalence of on-
reservation crime, and the lack of federal enforcement, often leaves non-
member defendants unpunished152 and tribal defendants with sentences that
may be disproportionately light.153 Functionally, the sentencing limits in the
ICRA have impeded tribal ability to effectively address serious crimes, in-
cluding crimes such as sexual assault and sex trafficking.154 In effect, the
144 See Seth Fortin, The Two-Tiered Program of the Tribal Law and Order Act, 61
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 88, 90–91 (2013).
145 See Soo C. Song &Vanessa J. Jime´nez, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction
Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1654–55 (1998) (noting that the limits
placed on tribal judicial systems by the jurisdictional scheme impedes tribal self-govern-
ment in their efforts to maintain safe and peaceful communities).
146 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 816. R
147 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 817. R
151 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Law, and the Inherent
Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77, 123 (2014).
152 See Timothy Williams, Higher Crimes, Fewer Charges on Indian Land, NEW
YORK TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reserva-
tions-higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html [https://perma.cc/L8G2-QBYJ] (report-
ing the low rate of federal prosecutions of major crimes occurring on Indian
reservations).
153 See Fortin, supra note 144, at 92. R
154 See id.
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ICRA has forced the tribes to ask Congress for federal authority over crimes
in Indian Country.155
5. Judicial Decisions Further Restricting Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction
Even with the substantial gains for tribal courts and tribes in the self-
determination era, the Supreme Court issued several decisions limiting tribal
authority to punish non-Indian offenders for on-reservation crimes.156
In 1978, the Supreme Court further limited tribal jurisdiction by hold-
ing that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defend-
ants.157 In Oliphant v. Suquamish, the question was whether the tribe had the
authority to prosecute a non-Indian who had committed a crime against an
Indian on the reservation.158 Initially, the Ninth Circuit upheld the exercise of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, reasoning that:
Federal law is not designed to cover the range of conduct normally
regulated by local governments. Minor offenses committed by
non-Indians within Indian reservations frequently go unpunished
and thus unregulated. . . . Prosecutors in counties adjoining Indian
reservations are reluctant to prosecute non-Indians for minor of-
fenses where limitations on state process within Indian country
may make witnesses difficult to obtain, where the jurisdiction divi-
sion between federal, state and tribal governments over the offense
is not clear, and where the peace and dignity of the government
affected is not his own but that of the Indian tribe. Traffic offenses,
trespasses, violations of hunting and fishing regulations, disorderly
conduct and even petty larcenies and simple assaults committed by
non-Indians go unpunished. The dignity of the tribal government
suffers in the eyes of Indian and non-Indian alike, and a tendency
towards lawless behavior necessarily follows.159
The Supreme Court abandoned this reasoning. The Court held that Indian
tribes do not have inherent sovereignty to try non-Indian criminal defend-
ants.160 Rather than adhering to long-established principles of Indian law, the
Court reasoned that historically the legislative and executive branches and
lower courts had presumed that Indian tribes did not have authority over
non-Indians who committed offenses within Indian country.161 The Court as-
155 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 826. R
156 See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
157 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
158 Id. at 194–95.
159 Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1013, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 1976).
160 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195–99; see also SMITH, supra note 153. R
161 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202–06.
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serted that, as domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes necessarily give up
their power to try non-Indian citizens except in a manner explicitly author-
ized by Congress.162 In a criminal case, tribal power was in conflict with the
overriding sovereign interests of the United States, because, since the Bill of
Rights was not applicable to tribal prosecution, such prosecution could result
in “unwarranted intrusions” on the personal liberty of non-Indians.163
Oliphant v. Suquamish greatly limits a tribe’s ability to protect its mem-
bers. Tribes, including the MHA Nation, now have little control over non-
Indian criminal offenders on their lands. Oliphant made clear that felony
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians falls exclusively within federal juris-
diction.164 Therefore, the federal government has an obligation to protect the
tribes because they have been subjected to the overriding regime of the
United States.165 By limiting the ability of the tribe to prosecute non-Indian
offenders, Oliphant removes tribal authority to act decisively regarding non-
Indian offenders in the movement to end trafficking and sexual assault.
In 1990, the Supreme Court further restricted tribal jurisdiction by hold-
ing in Duro v. Reina that a tribe’s retained sovereignty did not include the
authority to assert criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who was not a tribal
member.166 Duro was a Native man residing on the Salt River Indian Reser-
vation who was accused of killing a 14-year-old boy.167 He was charged in
federal court but the case was dismissed.168 Duro was then tried in tribal
court and filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona.169 The district court reasoned that Duro could not be
tried in tribal court because the tribe did not possess the authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indian offenders.170 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court agreed, stating that in the absence of special legislation, “In-
dians like other citizens are embraced within our Nation’s great solicitude
that its citizens be protected. . . from unwarranted intrusions on their per-
sonal liberty.”171 The court expressed concerned over foisting tribal courts’
“unique customs,” “unspoken practices and norms,” and a politically
subordinate court on nonmember Indians.172 Like the Court in Oliphant, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated that the inability to apply the Bill of Rights protections
was “all the more reason to reject an extension of tribal authority over those
who have not given the consent of the governed that provides a fundamental
162 See id. at 209–11; see generally SMITH, supra note 153 (describing the jurisdiction R
of tribes over non-tribal members, and the tribes’ jurisdictional relationship with the fed-
eral government).
163 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209–10; see also Skibine, supra note 151, at 90. R
164 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
165 See id. at 207.
166 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
167 See id. at 676–77.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 Id. at 677.
171 Id. at 692.
172 Id. at 693.
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basis for power within our constitutional system.”173 Although Kennedy ex-
pressed concern about non-members being subjected to cultural standards to
which they are not accustomed as justification for this limit of tribal author-
ity over non-members, he did not address the fact that this is also how the
federal government limits tribal governments.174 In fact, common law has
subjugated tribes through the implications of the Constitution, to which they
did not consent to be bound.175
IV. TOWARD A SOLUTION
Though the ability of the tribe to criminally prosecute sex traffickers on
the reservation is limited, there are several other available means that the
Tribe may explore to address the problem. This section will canvas both
criminal and civil remedies available to the tribe as well as other opportuni-
ties to build strong partnerships in order to combat trafficking. Specifically,
this section will address tribal capacity and coalition building, cross depu-
tization, and remedies contained in VAWA and TOLA. Finally, this section
will look at the opportunities available for corporate engagement to ensure
that the corporations working on the reservation are doing so responsibly
and in consideration of this issue. This section will address the possibilities
of shareholder engagement as well as changing corporate policies to help
prevent sex trafficking.
A. Legal Remedies
In 1991, as a fix to Duro v. Reina, Congress passed an amendment to
the ICRA that stated that, “‘powers of self government’ include ‘the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdictions over all Indians.’” 176 Congress defined an “Indian” as “any
person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an
Indian under section 1153, title 18 . . . .”177 This amendment extends tribal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Even with the expansion of jurisdic-
tion, the federal government retains concurrent jurisdiction, and nearly ex-
clusive criminal jurisdiction over felonies under the MCA.178 The MHA
nation would be able to extend concurrent jurisdiction only to the limits of
sentencing.
Even with the adoption of self-determination as the federal policy in
interacting with tribal nations, “felony criminal justice on Indian reserva-
173 Id. at 694.
174 See id. at 678.
175 See Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX REV. L. & POL. 329,
356–57 (2008).
176 SMITH, supra note 153, at 4. R
177 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012); see also SMITH, supra note 153, at 4. R
178 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 779–80. R
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tions has remained an exclusive federal function, and a highly ineffective
enterprise, according to critics, because the crime rate is worse for American
Indians than any other ethnic group.”179 It has been argued that the federal
government has not followed the general policy in criminal jurisdiction be-
cause “[i]t is doubtful that relinquishment of federal criminal jurisdiction
seemed viable to federal officials who viewed tribes as broken, dependent,
as poor as ever, and in need of tremendous federal assistance.”180 While the
federal government has occasionally taken interest, adding thirty FBI agents
to federal crime in 1997 and twenty-seven new positions in the FBI’s Indian
country unit in 2004, the problem has only worsened.181 These efforts at
improvement are hampered by the separation of the “mostly rural Indian
communities where these federal crimes occur” from the urban federal
courts that try them.182 Further, the vast cultural difference between the fed-
eral courts and the Indian people complicates interaction and enforcement.183
Indian law and federal policy regarding relations with tribes and Ameri-
can Indian individuals have fluctuated enormously over time. Early Supreme
Court decisions spoke of the unique legal status of Indian tribes and a special
relationship with the federal government.184 But because the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not clearly delineate every circumstance that can arise in the rela-
tionship, it has been left to Congress and the Supreme Court to define it. In
one of the first Supreme Court decisions on Indian affairs the Court held that
“the federal government has a duty to protect the interest of tribes.”185 This
duty became known as the “trust responsibility” and, pursuant to this re-
sponsibility, “the federal government owes a fiduciary duty to the tribes to
protect their interests.”186
The preeminent Indian law scholar, Felix Cohen, articulated three fun-
damental principles on the nature of Indian tribal powers.187 First, an Indian
tribe possesses all the powers of any sovereign state. Second, conquest ren-
ders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in
substance, terminates the external powers of the sovereignty of the tribe, but
does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers
of local self-government. Third, these powers are subject to quantification by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, thereby giving Congress ple-
nary power over Indian affairs.188
The federal government has thus used its power to limit tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-members—especially in the area of criminal law. These limi-
179 Id. at 779.
180 Id. at 811.
181 See id. at 789.
182 Id. at 781.
183 See id. at 782.
184 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1831).
185 Thorington, supra note 101, at 980; see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–17. R
186 Thorington, supra note 101, at 980. R
187 See COHEN, supra note 68, at 2. R
188 See id.
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tations stem from beliefs that tribes will unfairly implement their laws as to
non-members, thereby violating rights of non-members while allowing
members to go unpunished.189 Through its plenary power Congress has
passed legislation limiting the jurisdiction of tribal governments over non-
members and over certain crimes, even in regards to their own members. As
a result of “making felony criminal jurisdiction in Indian country a federal
responsibility, the United States undertook an important responsibility that it
has never effectively discharged. Simultaneously, it has left tribal govern-
ments, and consequently tribal communities, with little or no involvement in
the felony criminal justice systems on their own reservations.”190 The impo-
sition of this jurisdictional system illustrates a “unilateral imposition, by an
external authority, of substantive criminal norms on separate and indepen-
dent communities without their consent and often against their will.”191
Over time, the federal government has divested the Indian tribes of
their powers of criminal enforcement, and in doing so has taken on a re-
sponsibility to see that laws are enforced and violations prosecuted on reser-
vations.192 However, the “‘complex patchwork of federal, state and tribal
law’ and criminal jurisdiction . . . allows many perpetrators—particularly
non-Indians—to go unprosecuted.”193 This very problem is currently exem-
plified on the Fort Berthold reservation where, as the rates of sexual assault
and sex trafficking have risen, the federal government has not adequately
met its criminal enforcement responsibility.
1. Congressional Restoration of Tribal Jurisdiction
In recent years, Congress has passed two remedial acts that restore tri-
bal governments jurisdiction, allowing tribes to regain limited criminal juris-
diction in specific circumstances and to expand sentences, though with
significant restrictions. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (“TLOA”)
allows certain tribes to impose longer sentences, and the 2013 Amendment
to the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) authorizes tribes to investi-
gate, arrest, and prosecute non-members who engage in a very limited set of
domestic and dating violence crimes.194
By 2010, U.S. policy clearly encouraged tribal self-determination and
self-governance,195 but felony criminal justice on Indian reservations re-
mained an exclusively federal function.196 In 2010, Congress passed TLOA
in response to incredibly high rates of gang violence and high rates of sexual
189 See Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 782.
192 See id. at 822–26.
193 Hart, supra note 93, at 149 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990)). R
194 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302–1304 (2012).
195 See Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. II, 108 Stat.
4250 (1994).
196 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 834. R
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violence against Indian women.197 The main goals of TLOA were to bolster
tribal law enforcement agencies, increase coordination between tribes and
federal law enforcement agencies, and increase federal accountability in In-
dian country.198 TLOA “clarif[ies] the responsibilities of Federal, State, tri-
bal, and local governments with respect to crimes committed in Indian
country”; “increase[s] coordination and communication among Federal,
State, tribal and local law enforcement agencies”; “empower[s] tribal gov-
ernments with the authority, resources, and information necessary to safely
and effectively provide public safety in Indian country”; “reduce[s] preva-
lence of violent crime in Indian country and to combat sexual and domestic
violence”; and “increase[s] and standardize[s] the collection of criminal
data.”199
In passing the law, Congress explained that the “United States has dis-
tinct legal, treaty, and trust obligations to provide for the public safety of
Indian country.”200 In addition to this obligation, Congress further acknowl-
edged, “[T]ribal law enforcement officers are often the first responders to
crimes on Indian reservations; and tribal justice systems are often the most
appropriate institutions for maintaining law and order in Indian country.”201
Despite this fact, most of Indian country has less than half of the law en-
forcement that is present in similar rural communities around the country.202
Congress recognized that “the complicated jurisdictional scheme that exists
in Indian country has a significant negative impact on the ability to provide
public safety to Indian communities; has been increasingly exploited by
criminals; and requires a high degree of commitment and cooperation among
tribal, Federal and State law enforcement officials . . . .”203 Congress also
considered that “domestic and sexual violence against American Indian and
Alaska Native women has reached epidemic proportions . . . .”204 Further-
more, “Crime data is a fundamental tool of law enforcement, but for decades
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of Justice have not been
able to coordinate or consistently report crime and prosecution rates in tribal
communities.”205
197 See Hart, supra note 93, at 159–63, 175. R
198 Id.
199 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202, 124 Stat. 2258,
2262–2263.
200 Id. § 202(a)(1).
201 Id. § 202(a)(2).
202 Id. § 202(a)(3).
203 Id. § 202(a)(4)(A)–(C).
204 Id. § 202(5)(A).
205 Id. § 202(7).
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2. The Tribal Law and Order Act
TLOA includes provisions for Indian law enforcement, law enforce-
ment authority, and assistance by other agencies and jurisdictions.206 As to
jurisdiction, the statute provides that “the secretary shall have investigative
jurisdiction over offenses against the criminal laws of the United States in
Indian country subject to agreement between the Secretary [of Interior] and
the Attorney General.”207 Furthermore, it articulates that the BIA shall coop-
erate with the law enforcement agency having primary investigative jurisdic-
tion.208 Finally, the Act “does not invalidate or diminish any law
enforcement commission or delegation” and prior authority is to be unaf-
fected.209 The Act also considers state, tribal, and local law enforcement co-
operation, including cross-deputization agreements,210 in order to improve
law enforcement effectiveness and reduce crime in Indian country.211
TLOA also offers enhanced sentencing options for tribes.212 The Act
allows tribes to address crime in tribal communities and focuses on decreas-
ing violence against American Indian women.213 The Department of Justice
represents that:
The Act encourages the hiring of more law enforcement officers
for Indian lands and provides additional tools to address critical
public safety needs. Specifically, the law enhances tribes’ authority
to prosecute and punish criminals; expands efforts to recruit, train
and keep Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Tribal police of-
ficers; and provides BIA and Tribal police officers with greater
access to criminal information sharing databases. It authorizes new
guidelines for handling sexual assault and domestic violence
crimes, from training for law enforcement and court officers, to
boosting conviction rates through better evidence collection, to
206 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2802–2806 (2012).
207 Id. § 2806.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 See Tribal Law Enforcement, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=75 [https://perma.cc/VX6D-5MWK] (Cross deputization agree-
ments “[a]llow law enforcement personnel from state and tribal entities to cross jurisdic-
tions in criminal cases. Cross deputization agreements have been used to enhance law
enforcement capabilities in areas where state and tribal lands were contiguous and inter-
mingled. Under some agreements, federal state, county/local and/or tribal law enforce-
ment officers have the power to arrest Indian and non-Indian wrongdoers wherever the
violation of law occurs.”).
211 See 25 U.S.C. § 2815 (2012).
212 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 Sec.
234; see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENHANCED SENTENCING IN TRIBAL COURT
(2015), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/TLOA-TribalCtsSentencing.pdf [https://perma
.cc/J35V-SQU5] (describing changes from the Tribal Law and Order Act that allow for
increased sentences for certain crimes, and how those changes should be implemented).
213 See Tribal Law and Order Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/tribal/tribal-law-and-order-act [https://perma.cc/MYN9-YA84].
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providing better and more comprehensive services to victims. It
also encourages development of more effective prevention pro-
grams to combat alcohol and drug abuse among at-risk youth.214
TLOA also specifically requires that tribes ensure defendants have access to
competent and effective assistance of counsel.215 Tribes must also provide
judges who have significant legal training and are licensed to practice law.216
Each tribe must make its criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules of crimi-
nal procedure publicly available.217 Finally, tribes must maintain records of
criminal proceedings.218
TLOA is not a complete solution. Although it has the potential to
greatly improve law enforcement in Indian country, much of the Act is cen-
tered around increasing federal involvement.219 TLOA does not “retool crim-
inal law in Indian country; instead, it addresses particular areas of concern
and attempts to develop short-term solutions to them.”220 This act acknowl-
edges the tension between the interests of tribal sovereignty and the respon-
sibility of the federal government regarding the trust responsibility.221 In the
long term, more authority granted to tribal police and tribal courts will be
necessary.222 Currently, tribes must opt in to the Act to utilize its enhanced
sentencing provisions.223
The MHA Nation has yet to adopt the necessary laws and provisions to
opt in to TLOA.224 As such, the Tribe’s laws on sexual assault and sex traf-
ficking do not include enhanced sentencing. However, adopting TLOA may
help the MHA Nation combat trafficking. TLOA would provide the MHA
Nation more authority in criminal jurisdiction and enable cooperation with
other government and law enforcement agencies that share jurisdiction. Be-
cause of increased coordination and tribal prosecution, less information
would be lost and more offenders could be prosecuted.
3. The Violence Against Women Act Re-authorization of 2013
The 2013 reauthorization of VAWA includes provisions that signifi-
cantly improve the safety of Native women and allow federal and tribal law
enforcement agencies to hold more perpetrators of domestic violence ac-
214 Id.
215 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Hart, supra note 93, at 141. R
220 Id.
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENHANCED SENTENCING PROVISIONS, supra note 212. R
224 A list of Tribes that have implemented laws to opt in to TLOA can be found at
Tribes Executing Enhanced Sentencing, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://tloa.ncai
.org/tribesexercisingTLOA.cfm [https://perma.cc/9GXW-S3ES].
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countable for their crimes.225 VAWA grants certain tribes power to exercise
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over domestic violence cases, dating vio-
lence, and criminal violations of protection orders, regardless of whether the
defendant is Indian or non-Indian.226 Further, VAWA clarifies that tribal
courts have full civil jurisdiction to both issue and enforce protection orders
involving any person, Indian or non-Indian.227 The 2013 reauthorization of
VAWA created new federal statutes to address crimes of violence committed
against a spouse or intimate partner and provided more robust federal
sentences for certain acts of domestic violence in Indian Country.228 How-
ever, like the TLOA, VAWA requires tribes to commit to a lengthy process
subject to federal approval to provide certain enumerated due process pro-
tections before they can enforce its provisions.229
Tribes are free to choose whether or not they want to implement VAWA.
To date, the MHA Nation has not yet implemented VAWA. The Act does not
revoke the authority of U.S. attorneys and state/local prosecutors, where they
have jurisdiction, to prosecute offenders.230 Should a tribe choose to imple-
ment the Act, it only extends that tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans to include domestic violence, dating violence, and criminal violations of
protection orders.231 VAWA’s special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
restores a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction only over this limited subset of crimes.
Unfortunately, VAWA’s restoration of jurisdiction is limited. The tribal
provisions of VAWA do not cover sex trafficking outside of a dating or do-
mestic relationship, crimes committed outside of Indian country, crimes be-
tween two non-Indians, crimes between two strangers (including sexual
assaults), or crimes committed by a person who lacks “sufficient ties” to the
tribe.232 Additionally, the Act’s narrow focus extends only to partner vio-
lence, and does not authorize prosecution for destruction of a partner’s prop-
erty, violence against a partner’s parents, children, or other relatives, or other
acts of violence or intimidation.233
Although becoming a VAWA tribe would increase the scope of the
Tribe’s criminal jurisdiction, the Act would not be a complete solution to the
problem of sexual assault and sex trafficking. The tribal provisions within
VAWA will not apply to all sexual assaults on the reservation because the
225 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012); Indian Country Accomplishments of the Justice Depart-
ment, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2, 2015), http://justice.gov/tribal/accomplishments
[https://perma.cc/3AQV-AQDS].
226 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
227 Id.
228 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013 AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (June 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/leg
acy/2014/02/06/vawa-2013-tribal-jurisdiction-overnon-indian-perpetrators-domesticvi-
olence.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6SC-2JFQ].
229 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
230 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013, supra note 228. R
231 Id.
232 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
233 Id.
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perpetrator may not have the relationship to the victim that is necessary in
the statute. At issue is the inability to prosecute, convict or sentence crimes
between two strangers, including sexual assaults, and crimes committed by a
person who lacks sufficient ties to the tribe, such as living or working on the
reservation. Without the necessary relationship, the Tribe does not have ju-
risdiction and the federal government retains jurisdiction.234 Unless the defi-
nition of “intimate partner” could be expanded to include a single intimate
encounter, the adoption of the tribal provisions within VAWA would only
complicate jurisdiction, requiring analysis not just of where the crime oc-
curred and who was involved, but also the (easily disputed) relationship be-
tween the victim and the defendant.
Significantly, sex trafficking is included in VAWA in various ways in-
cluding by providing funding for improved victim services for minor victims
of human trafficking, ensuring specialized training of law enforcement in
identifying and serving minor victims, and expanding funds to provide law
enforcement with tools to adequately investigate these crimes.235 However,
the Act does not provide Tribes with jurisdiction over sex trafficking crimes
that occur on their lands, though VAWA does contemplate funding for coor-
dination and training of local and state police.236
Further limiting VAWA as a solution are the statutory prerequisites for
implementation.237 Instituting the necessary laws and systems would require
a significant investment of both time and money. The Tribe may need to
update its code to ensure defendants’ rights are respected. Finally, the Tribe
would have to have the capacity to police and prosecute the crimes listed in
VAWA.
Although the TLOA and VAWA have limitations, the MHA Nation will
have the authority and ability to protect the public safety of the reservation if
the requirements of both Acts are adopted and implemented. The TLOA,
towards which the MHA Nation is already working, only provides for ex-
tended sentencing. VAWA, with many of the same requirements, allows for
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
4. Other Federal Statutes on Sex Trafficking and Sexual Assault on
Fort Berthold
The intersection of sex trafficking with federal Indian law raises several
questions as to jurisdiction. The Mann Act of 1910 outlaws sex trafficking
activities that involve travel in “interstate or foreign commerce.”238 Al-
though The Mann Act was originally intended to combat prostitution, de-
bauchery and immorality, it has been amended so that it no longer legislates
234 Id.
235 42 U.S.C. § 14044b (2012).
236 25 U.S.C. § 1304(f).
237 25 U.S.C. § 1304; see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013, supra note 228. R
238 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012).
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morality.239 The Mann Act was amended in 1986 to revise transportation
requirements and to replace the terms “debauchery” and “immoral purpose”
with the term “sexual activity in which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense.”240 In 2015, the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act
amended both the Mann Act and 18 U.S.C. § 1591.241 The amendment now
permits state, general, and local district attorneys to prosecute cases under
the Mann Act, and it requires the federal government to explain why it de-
nied a request from the state to prosecute.242 The purpose of this amendment
was to “allow and encourage federal prosecutors to work with state officials
to prosecute Mann Act violations while increasing transparency.”243 Though
sex trafficking is generally a state crime, under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, it “is also
a federal crime when it involves conducting the activities of a sex trafficking
enterprise in a way that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”244 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591 provides:
[w]hoever knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means
a person; knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means
of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of
such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a com-
mercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18
years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall
be punished . . . by imprisoned for any term not less than 15 years
(not less than 10 years imprisonment, if the victim is 14 years of
age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age, provided
neither force nor deception were used).245
Both the Mann Act and 18 U.S.C. § 1591 create federal jurisdiction and
sentencing guidelines for sex and human trafficking within the power of the
Commerce Clause.246
239 Michael Conant, Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize
Prostitution, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL. 99, 99 (1996).
240 Id. at 116–17.
241 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227.
242 Press Release, U.S. Senator Dan Sullivan, Sullivan’s Amendment to Human Traf-
ficking Bill Passes Senate (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/sullivans-amendment-to-human-trafficking-bill-passes-senate [https://per
ma.cc/SH7K-7MRU].
243 Id.
244 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R43597, SEX TRAFFICKING: AN OVERVIEW
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2015).
245 Id. at 1–2.
246 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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In 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(“TVPA”).247 The purpose of the Act was to fight trafficking, described as a
“contemporary manifestation of slavery, whose victims are predominantly
women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers
and to protect their victims.”248 The TVPA was the first comprehensive fed-
eral law to address human trafficking.249 The law created a “three pronged
approach: prevention through public awareness programs overseas and a
State Department led monitoring and sanctions program; protection through
new T Visa services for foreign national victims; and prosecution through
new federal crimes.”250 The TVPA was reauthorized in 2003, 2005, and 2008
as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”).251
Through the TVPRA the US government is able to fund law enforcement as
well as services for survivors.252 The TVPRA seeks to combat both national
and international trafficking in persons.253 The TVRPA defines the penalties
for trafficking and promotes interagency cooperation. By reauthorizing this
legislation Congress has renewed its commitment to identifying human traf-
ficking, punishing those perpetrating the crimes, and helping the survivors
move beyond their victimization.254
Together, the Mann Act, the TVPA, treaties, and 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in-
creased federal jurisdiction and federal protection of trafficking victims, and
provide avenues for the federal government to gain jurisdiction over sex
trafficking in the Bakken region.255
Fort Berthold’s proximity to Canada exacerbates trafficking of indige-
nous women between Canada and the United States. The United States is a
signatory to several international treaties that decry trafficking of women
and girls–notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,256 the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),257 and the
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
247 Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7113 (2012)).
248 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a).
249 Id. § 7101(b)(14).
250 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA): Fact Sheet, POLARIS PROJECT, http://
files.meetup.com/1337582/Polaris%20TVPA%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH
3N-DKA8].
251 Current Federal Laws, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/current-fed-
eral-laws [https://perma.cc/N2N2-27YP].
252 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457,
122 Stat. 5044.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Current Federal Laws, supra note 251. R
256 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 71 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohib-
ited in all their forms.”). Trafficking is included in the definition of contemporary
slavery.
257 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 8, 24, 50, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR prohibits slavery, the slave trade, servitude and forced
labor in Article 8. Under Article 24 the U.S. has a special obligation to protect children.
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sons, especially Women and Children.258 As a result of these treaties, the
United States has an obligation to police, enforce and prosecute the crimes
of trafficking. Further, the TVPA strengthens the Unites States’s commit-
ment to protecting trafficking victims and ensuring their punishment. Sec-
ond, the federal government is afforded jurisdiction under the Mann Act and
18 U.S.C. §1591 for trafficking that affects or crosses into interstate com-
merce.259 These laws are vitally important for protecting the Bakken region,
as some victims of human and sex trafficking are taken through reservations
before moving across state lines.
Because of the complex nature of federal Indian law, determining crim-
inal jurisdiction for on-reservation crimes requires a factual analysis consid-
ering the identity and tribal status of all parties involved. Generally the state
has jurisdiction over crimes between two non-Indians, the tribe has jurisdic-
tion over crimes between two Indians, and the federal government has juris-
diction over crimes between a non-Indian and an Indian, and between two
Indians where the crime falls under the Major Crimes Act or the Assimila-
tive Crimes Act. Thus, the ability of the MHA Nation to prosecute non-
indigenous criminal offenders on the Fort Berthold reservation remains sig-
nificantly limited, even though the tribe has opted into the TLOA regime.
There is a practical jurisdictional vacuum concerning sex trafficking
and sexual assault on Indian reservations. Specifically, the federal govern-
ment has an unfulfilled obligation to police reservations, prosecute perpetra-
tors or enforce laws regarding sexual assault and sex trafficking on
American Indian reservations.260 Significantly, though these crimes tend to
be local and primarily affect the people on the reservation, if the crimes are
prosecuted as a felony, they must be adjudicated in the federal court
system.261
Further, because tribal jurisdiction is limited, the Tribe is not able to
prosecute non-Indian offenders for the crimes they have committed. Native
women hesitate to report to federal agents because of their lack of cultural
education and lack of action.262 The federal government is unable to provide
awareness and accountability in a culturally relevant way.263 In many cases
Finally, Article 50 states that, “The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all
parts of the federal States without any limitations or exceptions.”
258 G.A. Res. 55.25, United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, art. 5 (Nov 15, 2000). This U.N.
Protocol calls for a comprehensive approach to combat trafficking by preventing traffick-
ing, punishing offenders, and protecting victims. Article 5 requires States to criminalize
trafficking, attempted trafficking, and participation and organization of an organization
scheme.
259 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012); id. § 1591.
260 See Washburn, supra note 58, at 786. R
261 See id. at 827.
262 AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE 1, 4 (2007), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/
MazeOfInjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94V-R5QD].
263 Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 121, 128 (2004).
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victims and witnesses are unwilling to come forward because of this barrier
and the high likelihood that no action will be taken to investigate or prose-
cute their case.264 Such lack of action may come from a federal prosecutor’s
lack of experience prosecuting this type of case, a lack of resources to inves-
tigate, police, and prosecute these types of crimes on Native reservations, or
the federal prosecutor may just decline to prosecute.265 Unfortunately, it is
still true that “non-Indian perpetrators are well aware of the lack of Tribal
jurisdiction over them, the vulnerability of the Indian women, and the un-
likelihood of being prosecuted by the Federal Government (or state govern-
ment in Public Law 280 states) for their actions.”266
Another impediment is the difficulty in determining which entity has
jurisdiction in a given case. The state of North Dakota has jurisdiction over
the crime of sexual assault on the reservation in the case of a non-Indian
defendant and a non-Indian victim.267 In the case of an Indian defendant and
an Indian victim, the federal government has jurisdiction through the
MCA.268 The Tribe would also have concurrent jurisdiction with the MCA
but would be limited with sentencing by the ICRA.269 If the Tribe were to
meet the prerequisites of TLOA, they would have extended sentencing possi-
bility.270 Although the Tribe has not yet adopted the necessary protection to
enforce VAWA, through it the Tribe could have limited special domestic ju-
risdiction over sexual assaults that met the criteria of the statute.271 If there
were an Indian defendant and a non-Indian victim, the federal government
would have jurisdiction though the ICCA, the MCA and Oliphant.272 Again,
in this case, the tribes would have limited concurrent jurisdiction and could
prosecute and sentence the Indian defendant according to the ICRA.273 Simi-
larly, the Tribe would have special domestic jurisdiction if they became a
VAWA tribe.274 Finally, if there were a non-Indian defendant and an Indian
victim the federal government would have jurisdiction through Oliphant and
the ICCA.275 The only way the Tribe could exercise any type of jurisdiction
over the non-Indian would be through a limited special domestic jurisdiction
under VAWA.276 Jurisdiction over sex trafficking crimes involving a non-
Indian defendant and a non-Indian victim on the reservation would depend
264 Cynthia Castillo, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an Impartial Jury
After the 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311, 315 (2015).
265 Id.
266 Greer, supra note 25, at 478–79. R
267 See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
268 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
269 Id.
270 25 U.S.C. § 2801 (2012).
271 Id. § 1304; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013, supra note 228. R
272 18 U.S.C. § 1153; id. § 1152; see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 209–11 (1978).
273 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 2801.
274 Id. § 1304.
275 18 U.S.C. § 1152; see Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209–11.
276 25 U.S.C. § 1304; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013, supra note 228. R
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on whether the trafficking implicated interstate trafficking.277 An Indian de-
fendant and an Indian victim would give the federal government jurisdiction
under the MCA.278 The Tribe would maintain limited concurrent jurisdiction
with the sentencing restrictions of ICRA.279
The Tribe’s passage of Loren’s Law allows it to prosecute sex traffickers
only to a limited extent. A case involving an Indian defendant and a non-
Indian victim would have federal jurisdiction under the MCA and the ICCA,
though the Tribe would retain concurrent jurisdiction to apply Loren’s
Law.280 In a case involving a non-Indian defendant and an Indian victim the
federal government would have jurisdiction through the MCA, the ICCA
and Oliphant.281 Disturbingly, the Tribe would not have jurisdiction in such a
case even if it were to implement VAWA.282
5. State Remedies
Though the state of North Dakota has limited criminal jurisdiction on
the Fort Berthold reservation, the state is taking steps to include the tribes in
North Dakota in their effort to combat sex trafficking. The Uniform Act on
Prevention of and Remedies for Human Trafficking is codified as part of the
North Dakota Criminal Code and includes safe harbor laws for minors, in-
creased protections for victims, funding for law enforcement training, and
stronger penalties for convicted traffickers.283 The law includes federally rec-
ognized Indian tribes in the definition of “state,” thereby explicitly ex-
tending the law’s jurisdiction into the Fort Berthold reservation.284
The law gives rise to several civil actions, including allowing a victim
to bring an action for compensatory damages, exemplary or punitive dam-
ages, injunctive relief, and other forms of appropriate relief.285 Listed crimes
triggering these remedies include trafficking, forced labor, sexual servitude,
patronizing a victim of sexual servitude, and patronizing a minor, among
others.286 All are felonies.287 Business entities can be prosecuted for listed
offenses in a very limited set of circumstances.288 The business entity must
knowingly engage in conduct that constitutes human trafficking, and the
conduct must be part of a pattern of activity in violation of this legislation
and for the benefit of the entity, which the entity knew was occurring and
277 See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
278 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
279 25 U.S.C. § 2801.
280 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152–1153.
281 Id.; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209–11 (1978).
282 25 U.S.C. § 1304; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013, supra note 228. R
283 N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-41-01 to 21 (2012).
284 Id. § 12.1-41-01(11).
285 Id. § 12.1-41-15(1).
286 Id. § 12.1-41-02 to 06.
287 Id.
288 Id. § 12.1-41-07.
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failed to take effective action to stop.289 Finally, this legislation creates a
statewide Human Trafficking Commission that is tasked with distributing
$1.25 million allocated to victim services.290 The Commission must also de-
velop a plan for delivering victim services, collect data, raise public aware-
ness about trafficking, and coordinate trainings for state and local employees
regarding trafficking prevention.291 Notably, about $750,000 will go to west-
ern North Dakota specifically due to the rise in commercial sex ads in oil-
producing areas, including Fort Berthold.292
6. Tribal Remedies
Though the tribe is constrained in its ability to exercise criminal juris-
diction over non-Native perpetrators that commit crimes on the reservation,
the tribal government has invoked its sovereign authority over MHA Nation
members living on the reservation. The Tribe’s Loren’s Law applies to the
whole territory of the Fort Berthold reservation and outlaws labor and sex
trafficking, particularly of minors.293 Importantly, the scope of the resolution
only extends to members of a tribe, both perpetrators and victims.294 While
this does not approach the issue of non-indigenous perpetrators, it can apply
when the trafficker is Native American and a member of the victim’s fam-
ily—a familiar dynamic in trafficking scenarios. If convicted, the perpetrator
can be imprisoned for up to 365 days but not fewer than 150 days.295 Addi-
tionally the perpetrator can be fined a maximum of $5,000 and face banish-
ment from the reservation. Other sanctions can include probation, loss of
firearm privileges, substance abuse treatment, restraining orders, loss of a
business license, restitution paid out to the victim or a victim services organ-
ization, diversion of per capita payments, and/or mandatory registration as a
sex offender.296 Finally, Loren’s Law explicitly notes that violators of the
listed provisions can be subject to prosecution under both tribal and federal
law.297
289 Id. § 12.1-41-07(1).
290 See Mike Nowatzki, North Dakota’s Human Trafficking Commission Holds Inau-
gural Meeting, DICKINSON PRESS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.thedickinsonpress.com/
news/north-dakota/3829099-north-dakotas-human-trafficking-commission-holds-inaugu-
ral-meeting [https://perma.cc/TQ9Y-VXKU].
291 See id.
292 Amy Dalrymple, Laws Cracking Down on Human Trafficking in North Dakota
Take Effect Saturday, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.grandforksher-
ald.com/news/crime-and-courts/3808896-laws-cracking-down-human-trafficking-north-
dakota-take-effect-saturday [https://perma.cc/6BGF-PFJW].
293 Resolution No. 14-195-VJB, supra note 41. R
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
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The tribe has also established a Sex Offender Registry program,
modeled directly after the Adam Walsh Protection Act.298 Per the tribe’s di-
rective, “any convicted sex offender who lives, works, or attends school
within the exterior boundaries of the Three Affiliated Tribes, must register as
a Sex Offender with the Three Affiliated Tribes, in addition to any other
state, territory, or tribal registration.”299 Additionally, community members
may sign up to receive notifications based on a registrant’s name, or based
on an area code. However, there is currently no established mechanism to
ensure that workers living temporarily in the area are registered.
Unfortunately, the gaps in legal jurisdiction have created real safety
concerns for Native women and children on the Fort Berthold reservation.
While the FBI recently installed a new outpost in Williston to respond to the
increase in violent crime,300 there exists a real need for enhanced coordina-
tion between law enforcement agencies to meet the practical realities of po-
licing a crime that is as hidden and complex as sex trafficking on an Indian
reservation.
7. Civil Considerations
The Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (“IMDA”) authorizes
Indian tribes and allottees to enter into leases, ventures, and other agree-
ments for the purposes of mining subject to secretarial approval.301 The
IMDA states that the Secretary of the Interior must determine whether the
minerals agreement is “in the best interest of the Indian tribe or of any
individual Indian who may be party to such an agreement.” 302 Among other
considerations, the Secretary must ensure that the potential “environmental,
social, and cultural effects” of the agreement do not outweigh the expected
benefits under the lease (emphasis added).303 The responsibilities of the Sec-
retary are pursuant to the greater trust responsibility that the federal govern-
ment owes to Indian Nations, and the trust relationship is explicit in the
statute: “nothing in this chapter shall absolve the United States from any
responsibility to Indians, including those which derive from the trust rela-
tionship and from any treaties, Executive orders, or agreement between the
United States and any Indian tribe.”304
298 Three Affiliated Tribes Sex Offender Registry, MHA NATION, http://mhanation
.nsopw.gov/ [https://perma.cc/AM4F-4DEJ].
299 Id.
300 Archie Ingersoll, FBI’s Role Stays the Same as North Dakota Footprint Grows
With Williston Office, THE DICKINSON PRESS, Aug. 9, 2015, http://bismarcktribune.com/
news/state-and-regional/fbi-s-role-stays-the-same-as-footprint-grows-in/article_c7d135
27-6eba-5f5d-a078-78331d0785eb.html [https://perma.cc/6JKS-2DSA].
301 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012).
302 Id. § 2103(b) (emphasis added).
303 Id.
304 Id. § 2103(e).
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While the IMDA grants tribes and Indian individuals greater control of
mineral development on their lands than existed under previous regulatory
regimes, including the ability to negotiate leases with parties at the outset
and reap more of the financial benefit, tribal control is reduced in subsequent
phases of the mineral development process. Tribal control is greatly limited
by Department of Interior regulations that reserve the right to issue a notice
of noncompliance of cancellation with the tribe.305 Generally, the Secretary
may cancel a minerals agreement unilaterally for violations, but the Tribe
must seek judicial relief for breach of the agreement.
As such, the Secretary of the Interior has a fiduciary responsibility to
minimize the adverse cultural and social impacts from mineral development
when approving the leases per the IMDA. The United States, under IMDA,
must adequately consider the specific cultural and social effects attendant to
development on the Fort Berthold reservation as an Indian reservation. Since
there is a link between sex trafficking and the extractive industries, the
United States should have considered the possibility and implemented pro-
tective measures to promote safety and prevent harm. To the extent that the
Secretary did not consider the full impacts of mineral development that led
to the burgeoning increase in drug and sex trafficking, that failure may effect
tribal communities on Fort Berthold for generations to come.
The IMDA addresses the root issue that is fueling sex trafficking, and,
as such, confers upon federal government a duty to fulfill trust obligations
not only as to the economic aspects of the reservation, but also to the social
and cultural effects of development.
8. Tribal Mechanisms
There are several mechanisms that the MHA Nation itself can employ
to work towards a solution to this ongoing issue. In fact, several authors
have offered both legal and non-legal options to assist the tribe in these
endeavors. Dark Side of Oil Development provides an overview of strategies
ranging from local implementation of laws to advocates for increased utili-
zation of international instruments under the United Nations.306 Importantly,
that paper advocates for the Tribe to increase taxes to cover the cost of law
enforcement; to increase civil regulations as to trespass, assault and traffic
torts; to cross-deputize state and MHA Nation law enforcement; and to util-
ize the tribe’s power to exclude, among other strategies.307 The paper also
notes the need for national solutions, including amending VAWA, increasing
funding for tribal law enforcement, and requiring the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to more fully assess social and cultural impacts of oil and gas
305 See 25 C.F.R. § 225.36.
306 See Alex, supra note 4, at 11–23. R
307 Id. at 11–15.
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drilling.308 Raymond Cross, a tribal member and law professor at University
of Montana, highlights the need for creating a stronger regulatory regime
given the distinct social effects of oil and gas drilling on the Fort Berthold
reservation.309 He notes the need for the tribe to conduct a thorough over-
view of their existing oil and gas laws, and then amend the environmental
laws with stronger social and cultural safeguards.310 Finally, First Peoples
Worldwide, an organization dedicated to indigenous peoples’ economic self-
determination, advocates for increased corporate social responsibility by the
companies that are actively drilling in the Bakken, in recognition of the oil
“workers’ collusion in the growing sex trade.”311
As noted earlier, the tribe possesses civil and regulatory authority that
can cover much of the activity contemplated in this paper. The tribal Busi-
ness Council already enacted Loren’s Law to address trafficking on the res-
ervation. However, the scope of the resolution was limited to apply to only
indigenous actors and the sanctions were relatively light in the face of the
crime of trafficking. One additional step the tribe could take would be to
become a TLOA tribe. If the MHA Nation were to opt into the TLOA, they
could extend sentencing of Indian defendants.312 In so doing, the MHA Na-
tion could revise Loren’s Law to increase the sanctions up to the limits in the
TLOA.
B. Comprehensive Solutions
In addition to asserting regulatory jurisdiction, the tribe could also en-
gage with the many entities, public and private, that are implicated in traf-
ficking. Since the issue of sex trafficking coincident with oil and gas
development on the large Fort Berthold reservation is so complex, these op-
portunities should be engaged as soon as possible to provide a comprehen-
sive solution. Two key predicates for a successful dialogue and partnership
between stakeholders are 1) compiling hard data on sex trafficking, and 2)
building tribal capacity to engage and implement affirmative solutions.
Structuring strong coalitions with various partners will build awareness and
strength to effectively reach the root of the problem – the influx of workers
with money and without bonds to the community.
North Dakota’s new anti-trafficking legislation establishes a Human
Trafficking Commission that specifically creates seats for tribal participa-
tion.313 Just as the Fort Berthold reservation could benefit from receiving a
portion of the funds the law allocates for victim services, it would also bene-
308 Id. at 15–18.
309 See Cross, supra note 8, at 550–55. R
310 Id.
311 See Cheney, supra note 5. R
312 25 U.S.C. § 2801 (2012).
313 N.D. Cent. Code § 54-12-33.
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fit from this critical connection to state politics, interested non-profit organi-
zations, and other organizations that could provide expertise and assistance.
1. Cross-Deputization
Another collaborative strategy to approach the jurisdictional barriers in
identifying trafficking and arresting perpetrators would be to cross-deputize
tribal and state police. Cross-deputization agreements allow tribal, federal,
state or local law enforcement officers to enforce laws outside their jurisdic-
tion regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.314 Tribal law enforcement
agencies enter cross-deputization agreements for any number of reasons, and
the scope of jurisdiction and enforcement also varies widely. Some agree-
ments allow cross-deputization only as to natural resources enforcement, and
some agreements give state and local police enforcement wide arrest powers
on reservation lands. However, the common goal of all of these agreements
is to allow different agencies to work together cooperatively to enhance pub-
lic safety for those living in Indian Country.315
Recently, the Oglala Sioux tribe’s attorney general was cross-deputized
as a deputy state attorney in Bennett County, South Dakota.316 Her dual roles
will increase the tribe’s ability to meaningfully participate in cases that are
ultimately prosecuted in state court.317 This innovative procedure is meant to
cut through the jurisdictional hurdles present in Indian Country so that non-
Native perpetrators are effectively held accountable for their actions.318 The
MHA Nation and the state of North Dakota could explore this type of agree-
ment in order to ensure that perpetrators that move on and off the reservation
are brought to justice, and that trafficking victims can access appropriate
social services.
Cross-deputization between the MHA police and state and local police
may also be utilized to enforce existing laws regarding trafficking. For ex-
ample, the new North Dakota Uniform Law extends jurisdiction over the
reservation,319 but there may be a gap in enforcing the new laws. Negotiating
an appropriate agreement between sovereigns will not only clarify the reach
of the laws, but assist officers in their work to identify traffickers and detain
them properly. Cross-deputization agreements will require negotiation of
314 HANNAH BOBEE ET AL., CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE SOLU-
TION OF CROSS DEPUTIZATION 11–12 (2008), http://www.law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers/
2008-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/68YU-XPU7].
315 Id. at 12.
316 Tribal Prosecutor Deputized in State Court, RED LAKE NATION NEWS (Dec. 3,
2015), http://www.redlakenationnews.com/story/2015/12/03/news/tribal-prosecutor-dep-
utized-in-state-court/41739.html [https://perma.cc/RCQ5-RWYT].
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-41-01.
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certain terms, such as sovereign immunity, personnel, indemnification, lia-
bility, and severability and termination.320
2. Tribal Regulation
The Tribe can exercise its regulatory authority over companies on the
reservation. Both the MHA Energy Division and the TERO Office work
with oil and gas entities operating on the reservation. The MHA Energy
Division is tasked primarily with responsible management of natural re-
sources on the reservation, and one of the department’s stated values is social
responsibility.321 The office manages certain aspects of tribal lease permit-
ting, and could provide a definitive list of the companies operating on and
near Fort Berthold. Similarly, the Tribal Employment Rights Office (“TERO
Office”) regulates employers who are awarded contracts or subcontracts that
total $5,000 or more and whose work takes place within the jurisdiction of
the reservation.322 The TERO Office was created specifically to forward the
Nation’s sovereignty by requiring employers that operate on the Fort Ber-
thold reservation to institute Indian hiring preferences.323 Notably, contracts
involving oil and gas exploration require the outside entities to first contract
with businesses that are 100% owned and controlled by an enrolled mem-
ber.324 This provides an economic benefit to member-owned businesses, and
may provide an important mechanism for possible engagement with these
companies.
Enforcement of permits and contracts through both the TERO office
and the MHA Energy Division occur through the regulatory and civil author-
ity of the Tribe. The leading case on tribal assertion of civil jurisdiction,
Montana v. U.S., provides that an Indian tribe has civil jurisdiction over
“nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its mem-
bers,” and over nonmembers whose activity “threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or wel-
fare of the tribe.”325 The MHA Nation creates, through the Energy Division
and the TERO office, the type of consensual relationship required by Mon-
tana to hold non-Indian entities accountable on the reservation.
320 Paul Stenzel, MOUs and MOAs: A Cooperative Approach to Law Enforcement on
the Reservation, at 3–4 (Nov. 5, 2005), http://www.paulstenzel.com/multi-j-110305.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D5Q-F49N].
321 About MHA Energy Division, MHA NATION, http://www.mhanation.com/main2/
departments/mha_energy_division/mhaenergydivision_about.html [https://perma.cc/635
S-NDVD].
322 TERO Ordinance and Regulations of the Three Affiliated Tribes; Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara § 301 (May 8, 2012), http://www.mhatero.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
AXT_2_1ZF10.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL9X-8BSA].
323 What is TERO?, MHA TERO, http://www.mhatero.com/what-is-tero/ [https://per
ma.cc/AS4C-V3YS].
324 TERO Ordinance, supra note 322, at § 202. R
325 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S 544, 565–66 (1981).
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The Tribe could make adherence to provisions that bolster anti-traffick-
ing measures, one aspect of the permitting criteria for outside oil and gas
entities, either through the permitting process in the MHA Energy Division
or through the TERO office.326 The Tribe could also integrate this type of
social responsibility into their business code. Then, if companies and/or their
workers were found to be participating in, or allowing, sex trafficking, those
companies could be held accountable and/or be subject to licenses suspen-
sion. In creating remedial measures, the Tribe must conform with federal
law, but by integrating this type of remedy, the tribe would be more able to
hold businesses and their workers accountable for the social and cultural
effects attendant to oil and gas development.
C. Corporate Engagement
1. Corporate Responsibility
While the problem of sexual assault and human trafficking in Fort Ber-
thold is exacerbated by the jurisdictional tangle that has stripped the tribes of
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers without creating effective systems to
fill that vacuum, the various governments are not the only parties with an
interest in the problem. The oil and gas corporations operating on the Fort
Berthold reservation and in the greater Bakken region are exposed to signifi-
cant financial, legal, and reputational risk. They have a direct interest in the
problem and a clear need to address it. Existing data indicates a rise in crime
that is clearly tied to the sharp increase in population as well-paid oil work-
ers have moved into the region.327 Efforts to combat the rise of human traf-
ficking and sexual assault in Fort Berthold must not be limited to the
reservation but must also address oil and gas operations in the region as a
whole.
Corporate responsibility arises from not only each company’s involve-
ment in the problem, but also from each company’s obligations to its share-
holders and to local communities.328 Those obligations include a duty to
invest and operate with fiscal responsibility and avoid undue risk, as well as
an obligation to operate within both legally imposed and self-determined
standards of operation. Every company has a fiduciary obligation to main-
tain its image, maintain its profitability, and avoid legal risk.
326 See Alex, supra note 4, at 14–15. R
327 Horwitz, supra note 2. R
328 Cf. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, 13–15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (building up the
Framework to ensure that businesses and States protect human rights in relation to all
business enterprises) (hereinafter “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights”).
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The Indigenous Rights Risk Report, produced by First Peoples World-
wide (“FPW”), assesses some of the financial, social, and legal risks associ-
ated with extractive industries operating on and near indigenous lands.329
Assessing 330 projects across fifty-two US-based companies, FPW found
that 35% of the projects had high-risk exposure to community opposition for
violating Indigenous rights, 54% had medium risk exposure, and only 11%
had low risk exposure.330 FPW found that this negative attention to projects
impacting indigenous peoples has been increasing steadily, and attributes
that rise to the growing use of social media campaigns to draw attention to
social harms.331 The report includes assessments of twelve projects in the
North Dakota Bakken. Of those twelve projects, ten were high risk (Hess,
WPX, Continental, EOG, Marathon, Newfield, Occidental, QEP, SM, and
Whiting) and two were medium risk (ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips).332
The Risk Report specifically assigns a high community risk score to
Fort Berthold operations because of socioeconomic and environmental deg-
radation that could limit corporations’ ability to operate.333 As described
above, the MHA Nation and its members have several avenues that could be
used to regulate a company’s ability to operate on the reservation, including
modifying its regulatory laws. Even those companies operating off-reserva-
tion face significant risks. In addition to damaging their public image, they
risk potential civil or criminal litigation rooted in their relationship to traf-
ficking crimes committed on their properties or leaseholds, or by their
employees.
Companies have a fiduciary obligation to act in accordance with their
stated policies, including policies on social and environmental responsibility.
Many shareholders are committed to social investing principles, using their
money to invest in and support companies that have positive impacts on
issues like human rights, environmental stewardship, and consumer protec-
tion. This commitment can arise from both moral and financial concerns, as
opposition to harmful projects can create delays and significant cost over-
runs. John Ruggie, who led the development of the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, told Business Ethics that “for a world-class
mining operation. . . there’s a cost somewhere between $20 million to $30
million a week for operational disruptions by communities” and that the
time it takes to bring oil and gas projects online has “doubled over the
course of the previous decade, creating substantial cost infla-
329 See REBECCA ADAMSON & NICK PELOSI, FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS RISK REPORT (2014), http://www.firstpeoples.org/images/uploads/Indigenous%
20Rights%20Risk%20Report(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/J4U8-ZT67].
330 Id. at 24.
331 Id. at 28.
332 Id. at 35–36. For a list of companies currently operating in the Bakken see Bakken
Shale Companies and Active Operators, BAKKEN SHALE, https://bspmigrate-216.square
space.com/companies [https://perma.cc/SX5L-QCDN].
333 Id. at 29.
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tion.”334 Additionally, “[a]nalysis by Environmental Resources Manage-
ment of delays associated with a sample of 190 of the world’s largest oil and
gas projects (as ranked by Goldman Sachs) found that 73 percent of project
delays were due to ‘above-ground’ or non-technical risk, including stake-
holder resistance.”335 Concerned shareholders, through their investment,
have a voice to improve corporate operations. And when shareholders feel
that their investment is contributing to activities that work against their inter-
ests, they can exercise that voice.
2. Shareholder Action
Shareholders have several direct avenues with which to influence cor-
porate activities and corporate policy. Holding shares in a corporation con-
fers rights of ownership, and allows shareholders access to contacts,
information, and remedies not available to others. The simplest form of en-
gagement available to shareholders is initiating dialogue.336 Investors, espe-
cially groups holding non-negligible stakes in the company, may be able to
arrange formal meetings with representatives or members of corporate lead-
ership, along with other interested parties, to discuss investor concerns re-
garding trafficking.337 These meetings serve to make the company aware of
both the issue itself and the fact that investors are making decisions with that
issue in mind. This alone may be sufficient to prompt a company to assess
its policies and the effects of its presence on criminal activity in the Bakken
region.
Approaching individual companies comes with challenges. An individ-
ual company may be reluctant to take on responsibilities in the region when
it appears, as it does in Fort Berthold, that the negative impacts on the reser-
vation are the result of the cumulative activities (and inactivity) of many
different groups. Companies will deny responsibility for the off-the-clock
activities of their employees, and will likely reference the small percentage
of the regional population increase for which they are responsible. An indi-
vidual company might believe that there are significant risks that could fol-
low from taking on responsibilities for mitigating the effects of its operations
if their own individual impact is negligible or cannot be readily quantified,
and if there is no guarantee that other companies will step in to share the
334 Michael Connor, Business and Human Rights: Interview with John Ruggie, BUS.
ETHICS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://business-ethics.com/2011/10/30/8127-un-principles-on-
business-and-human-rights-interview-with-john-ruggie/ [https://perma.cc/VD33-YSQ9].
335 Michael Hackenbruch, & Jessica Davis Pluess, Business for Social Responsibility,
Commercial Value From Sustainable Local Benefits in the Extractive Industries: Local
Content 2 (2011), http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_LocalContent_March2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T7J-FXV5].
336 See, e.g., Corporate Dialogues, INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, http://www.iccr.org/our-approach/shareholder-engagement-101/corporate-dialogues
[https://perma.cc/2Q33-2HMD].
337 See id.
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burden. To avoid this, discussions can be convened between multiple compa-
nies, trade associations, and other invested and interested parties to make
industry-wide adoption of requested practices more likely.338
Where companies are non-responsive to dialogue or requests for dia-
logue, investors can file Shareholder Resolutions. Shareholder Resolutions
are proposals that ask a corporation to take a specific action.339 In this case,
shareholders would likely ask the corporation to disclose or measure the
impacts of its operations or to adopt practices to mitigate known impacts.
The process for filing and voting on shareholder resolutions may vary based
on the country or province in which each corporation is headquartered, but it
generally follows a set pattern. For companies based in the U.S., a resolution
must first be drafted. Resolutions must be clear in asking for specific actions
by the corporation.340 Once drafted, a shareholder with a sufficient holding
($2000 or 1% of the company in the U.S.) may file the resolution with the
company.341 When a resolution is filed, a corporation may accept it and al-
low the resolution to go to a vote, implement the requested action immedi-
ately and have the resolution withdrawn, or file a no action request with the
SEC or other appropriate governing body.342 Common reasons for a no ac-
tion request are that the resolution asks the company to violate the law, con-
tains false or misleading information, relates to projects worth less than 5%
of the company’s assets, asks the company to do something it has already
done or does not have the authority to do, conflicts with a proposal that has
already been filed, or fits the ordinary business exclusion.343 The ordinary
business exclusion allows companies to exclude resolutions that go to the
day-to-day management of the company in order to avoid micromanagement
by shareholders.344 Because the issue of human trafficking and sexual assault
surrounding a company’s operations in the Bakken region creates potential
legal and financial risk, as well as considerable potential for reputational
harm, this issue is well outside of ordinary business operations. Addition-
ally, combating human trafficking and sexual assault is likely well outside of
the expertise of corporate managers, making it unlikely that concerns relat-
ing to it could fall within ordinary business operations.
If accepted, a Shareholder Resolution will appear on the proxy state-
ments distributed to shareholders before a company’s annual meeting. These
proxy statements will also include supporting documentation and the com-
338 See Roundtables, INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, http://
www.iccr.org/our-approach/shareholder-engagement-101/roundtables [https://perma.cc/S
Q94-3DMM].
339 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2011).
340 Id. § 8(a).
341 Id. § 8(b).
342 William A. Klein, J. Mark Ramseyer & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Business As-
sociations 530 (2015).
343 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i).
344 Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 341–42 (3rd Cir.
2015).
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pany’s response to each resolution.345 At this point, shareholders have the
opportunity to lobby for support for (or opposition to) proposals, and then to
vote. Because accepted Shareholder Resolutions are made public and distrib-
uted to shareholders, simply introducing a proposal may be sufficient to en-
tice a company to enter or reenter dialogue with concerned investors and ask
that the Shareholder Resolution be withdrawn. If the resolution goes to a
shareholder vote and passes, a company is obligated to implement it. Resolu-
tions that do not pass may be resubmitted in following years if they receive
at least 3% of votes in their first year, 6% in their second, and 10% in all
years following.346
Where dialogue and resolutions have failed, a final option is divest-
ment. Because severing investor ties to a corporation limits the possibility of
later dialogue, divestment is viewed as a tool of last resort.347 If used, it can
serve to demonstrate resolve on an issue, to discourage other companies
from engaging in similar practices, and to create negative publicity and ad-
ded pressure to solve the problem. Significantly, owing to ongoing concerns
about the impacts of the fossil fuel industry, certain key institutional inves-
tors have already fully divested from their holdings in the sector.348 Investor
concerns about long-term profitability of oil, especially when prices are al-
ready falling steadily,349 could also provide a strong incentive for companies
to engage with investors as to their concerns, including concerns over im-
pacts related to trafficking.
3. Corporate Policies
Many of the companies operating in the Bakken region have adopted
and incorporated policies that address how they engage with indigenous peo-
ples or, more generally, the communities in which they operate. In dialogue
with corporations, or through Shareholder Resolutions, investors can ask
other companies to adopt similar policies on interaction with indigenous
peoples, on human trafficking, and on human rights more generally. When
requesting that a corporation adopt these policies, investors can look to poli-
cies developed by other corporations in the same industry, and to interna-
tional declarations, agreements, and standards that address the issues of
human trafficking and indigenous rights. The following are a selection of
345 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(m).
346 Id. § 8(i)(12).
347 See generally Shareholder Advocacy 101: A Primer on Active Ownership, INTER-
FAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.iccr.org/our-approach/shareholder-en-
gagement-101 [https://perma.cc/QKZ7-YLTV] (noting that investors may choose to
divest as a last step of protest against an institution).
348 See, e.g., Divestment Statement, ROCKEFELLER BROS. FUND (2014), http://www
.rbf.org/sites/default/files/rbf-divestment_statement-2016-03-march.pdf [https://perma
.cc/77ZZ-CS79].
349 Oil Price Steadies After Falling Below $28 a Barrel, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35340893 [https://perma.cc/P878-2XTJ].
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excerpted policies and standards that have been adopted by some of the
companies operating in the region.
Several companies operating in the Bakken region have incorporated
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). The UDHR prima-
rily addresses governmental responsibilities towards the rights of citizens
and does not clearly create any responsibilities for businesses.350 However,
adoption of the UDHR is, at minimum, a recognition of the rights to liberty
and security of person that may be impacted by the activities of corporate
employees.
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”)
focuses primarily on member state obligations. However, its principles can
be applied to corporate interaction with communities.351 UNDRIP’s provi-
sions enumerate tribal rights to participate in decision-making that affects
their rights, lands, territories, and resources. UNDRIP also includes rights to
compensation for activities that impact “their lands . . . particularly in con-
nection with the development, utilization, or exploitation of mineral . . .
resources”352 and to prompt, “just, and fair resolution of conflicts and dis-
putes.”353 Corporate adoption of UNDRIP’s principles both commits to re-
specting state policies protecting indigenous groups and suggests that even
where indigenous rights and interests are not sufficiently preserved by the
state, the company does not have free rein to ignore instances where their
activities enable or result in human rights violations.
The International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 Concerning In-
digenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (“ILO 169”) is a
binding international convention.354 Like UNDRIP, ILO 169 focuses prima-
350 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 256. R
351 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples (Oct. 2, 2008). The portions of UNDRIP relevant to the situation in Fort Berthold
are: Article 18, which provides, “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in deci-
sion-making in matters which would affect their rights”; Article 26(2), which provides,
“Indigenous peoples have the right to . . . control the lands, territories and resources that
they possess”; Article 32(2), which provides, “States shall consult and cooperate in good
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions
in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project
affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources”; Article
32(3), which provides, “States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair re-
dress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse
environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact”; and Article 40, which pro-
vides, “Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through just
and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or other par-
ties, as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collec-
tive rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules
and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.”
352 Id. at Art. 32(2).
353 Id. at Art. 40.
354 INT’L LABOR ORG., INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION, C169, (June
27, 1989), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P121
00_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 [https://perma.cc/SV5Y-FA2U]. The portions of ILO
169 relevant to the situation in Fort Berthold are: Article 4(1), which provides, “Special
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rily on government obligations to respect and preserve indigenous rights.
The principles of ILO 169 illustrate the risks that development poses to in-
digenous groups’ social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices.
Ultimately, ILO 169 requires signatories to take special measures to safe-
guard indigenous interests, both by assessing risks through preliminary stud-
ies on the impact of planned development and by adopting policies “aimed
at mitigating the difficulties experienced”355 by those groups as a result of
that development.
The United Nations Global Compact (“the Compact”) is an initiative
that encourages companies to act strategically and responsibly to support the
people and communities in which they operate and to report annually on
those efforts. Specifically relating to the issues of human trafficking and
indigenous rights, the principles of the Compact state that “Businesses
should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed
human rights” and “make sure that they are not complicit in human rights
abuses.”356
Companies that have incorporated World Bank’s Operational Policy and
Bank Procedure on Indigenous Peoples commit to a system of “free, prior,
and informed consultation” with indigenous groups that also requires com-
panies to formulate an action plan to “avoid, minimize, mitigate, or compen-
sate for” the adverse effects of their operations.357
The International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standard 7 di-
rectly addresses indigenous peoples’ right to the land. However, within that
area, Performance Standard 7 requires risk assessment, development of a
plan to address identified risks, and ongoing consultation with affected in-
digenous groups throughout the entire project.358 Additionally, Performance
Standard 7 requires companies conducting operations directly on tribal land
measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, prop-
erty, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned”; Article 5, which pro-
vides, “In applying the provisions of this Convention:(a) the social, cultural, religious
and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and
due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups
and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peo-
ples shall be respected; (c) policies aimed at mitigating the difficulties experienced by
these peoples in facing new conditions of life and work shall be adopted, with the partici-
pation and co-operation of the peoples affected”; and Article 7(3), which provides,
“Governments shall ensure that, whenever appropriate, studies are carried out, in co-
operation with the peoples concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environ-
mental impact on them of planned development activities. The results of these studies
shall be considered as fundamental criteria for the implementation of these activities.”
355 Id. at Art. 5(c).
356 The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COM-
PACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles [https://perma.cc/
LSS7-3Q4H].
357 WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL MANUAL § 4.10 (2013).
358 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, PERFORMANCE STANDARD 7–8 (2012).
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to engage with the tribe through a system of free, prior, and informed
consent.359
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(“the UN Guiding Principles”) create what may be the clearest set of spe-
cific duties that companies have with respect to human rights.360 Companies
that have adopted the UN Guiding Principles take on the responsibility to
“address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”361 In
addressing violations, the UN Guiding Principles lay out a clear path for
corporations to follow, first assessing and identifying the human rights risks
created both by their own operations and by other parties linked to them
through business relationships, then creating and executing a plan to mini-
mize or mitigate those risks. The UN Guiding Principles would necessarily
encompass the trafficking problem on Fort Berthold and require companies
to address harmful activities by individuals, including employees and con-
tractors, and require review of the policies of business partners operating at
other points in that corporation’s supply chain.
Adoption of appropriate company policies is only a first step. Policies
create a framework in which companies can develop a clearer understanding
359 Id.
360 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 328. The portions R
of the UN Guiding Principles relevant to the situation in Fort Berthold are: Principle 13,
which provides, “The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enter-
prises: (a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their
own activities, and address such impacts when they occur; (b) Seek to prevent or mitigate
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or
services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those im-
pacts”; Principle 15, which provides: “In order to meet their responsibility to respect
human rights, business enterprises should have in place policies and processes appropri-
ate to their size and circumstances, including: (a) A policy commitment to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights; (b) A human rights due-diligence process to iden-
tify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights;
(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause
or to which they contribute”; Principle 17, which provides, “In order to identify, prevent,
mitigate and account for how they address their adverse human rights impacts, business
enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence. The process should include as-
sessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the find-
ings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. Human rights
due diligence: (a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise
may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to
its operations, products or services by its business relationships”; and Principle 21, which
provides, “In order to account for how they address their human rights impacts, business
enterprises should be prepared to communicate this externally, particularly when con-
cerns are raised by or on behalf of affected stakeholders. Business enterprises whose
operations or operating contexts pose risks of severe human rights impacts should report
formally on how they address them. In all instances, communications should: (a) Be of a
form and frequency that reflect an enterprise’s human rights impacts and that are accessi-
ble to its intended audiences; (b) Provide information that is sufficient to evaluate the
adequacy of an enterprise’s response to the particular human rights impact involved; (c)
In turn not pose risks to affected stakeholders, personnel or to legitimate requirements of
commercial confidentiality.”
361 Id. at Art. 17
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of the effects of their operations on the surrounding communities, but the
framework is only useful insofar as companies commit to actual implemen-
tation. Within the context of development on or near tribal land, indigenous
groups have more information on how projects will affect their members,
and creating a system to engage with tribes will help in responding to or
preempting any problems that may arise. Further, company policies create
clear standards for assessing and reporting operational risks to cultural, so-
cial, environmental, and other interests. Companies that both adopt and fol-
low their own policies will be better able to anticipate and prevent the
negative impacts of their operations and clearly articulate to concerned
shareholders and stakeholders and to affected communities how they man-
age those risks. The assessment and reporting requirements of these stan-
dards also act as an information-gathering mechanism that would allow
companies, investors, and concerned parties to craft more targeted policy
suggestions to combat human rights violations linked to, incidental to, or
simply happening in the region of corporate projects.
4. Best Practices
While adoption of appropriate policies may express corporate recogni-
tion of rights and a general commitment to avoiding their violation, they do
not directly translate into practices that preserve those rights. The specific
problem of human trafficking and sexual assault in the Bakken region neces-
sitates that companies reduce the impact of their operations and protect and
aid victims through implementation of best practices. Suggestions for best
practices to address the problem of trafficking and sexual assault include:
• Background Checks. Corporations should expand their use of back-
ground checks within the hiring process. While there is a lack of data
with respect to the Fort Berthold reservation, reports to Congress have
indicated that the Fort Peck reservation has seen the number of regis-
tered sex offenders in the area increase from forty-eight in 2012 to
over six hundred in 2013. Companies could play a significant role
both by controlling whom they hire and by requiring employees to
comply with local and Tribal laws on registration and disclosure.
• Employee Housing. Because of the rapid influx of new residents,
makeshift housing sites, often called “man camps,” have been estab-
lished for industry workers. Some camps are simply collections of
trailers that do not have addresses, do not appear on maps, do not have
connections to phone, internet, or cell services, and are not easily ac-
cessible to emergency services. Corporations must take a more active
role in ensuring employees have access to proper housing on arrival in
the region. Additionally, they should help to ensure access to emer-
gency services by requiring employees to provide and maintain docu-
mentation of their current address.
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• Law Enforcement Coordination. Engaging in and maintaining regular
dialogue with local law enforcement would allow companies to better
understand the impact of their activities on the community. Compa-
nies should seek input as to whether local agencies have the capacity
to keep pace with increases in population and crime, and incorporate
that information into their risk assessments and risk management.362
• Expanded Impact Assessments. When performing Social and Environ-
mental Impact Assessments, corporations should expand their inquiry
beyond their own activities and consider the cumulative impact of
their operations, alongside other development in the area, on health
and safety in the community.
• Board Oversight of Existing Policies. Of the fifty-two companies sur-
veyed in its Indigenous Rights Risk Report, First Peoples Worldwide
found that only four had board oversight of community relations,
human rights, or social performance.363 Increasing (or establishing)
oversight could encourage implementation of preventive policies,
rather than relying only on after-the-fact damage control.
• Corporate Partner and Contractor Compliance. Corporations should
adopt specific policies on human rights and human trafficking, and
include compliance with those policies as a requirement for all sub-
contractors and suppliers seeking a business partnership.364
• Internal Policing. Corporations should act to deter criminal conduct by
their employees with the adoption of policies on community responsi-
bility and employee conduct, along with strict enforcement of those
policies. While criminal enforcement is limited, corporations have the
ability to reprimand or terminate employees who engage in conduct
that reflects poorly on the company.
• Employee Training. Following the example of groups like Truckers
Against Trafficking, corporations in the Bakken region should provide
employee education and training on human trafficking and sexual as-
sault, enabling their employees to better identify and report illegal
activity.365
• Coordination with Other Groups. Providing avenues for individuals,
business partners, or local aid groups to report suspicious or illegal
activity could allow corporations to better identify and respond to is-
sues or gaps within their human rights or human trafficking policies.366
362 HAQ CENTRE FOR CHILD RIGHTS, COMPENDIUM OF BEST PRACTICES ON ANTI
HUMAN TRAFFICKING BY NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 21 (2008), https://www
.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/India_Training_material/Compendium_of_Best
_Practices_by_NGOs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YUC-92V9].
363 ADAMSON & PELOSI, supra note 329, at 31. R
364 See, e.g., THE PROTECTION PROJECT, 100 BEST PRACTICES IN COMBATING TRAF-
FICKING IN PERSONS 25 (2012), http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgehub/resource-cen-
tre/CSOs/100-Best-Practices-in-Combating-TIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMP9-V758].
365 See, e.g., id. at 58, 61.
366 See, e.g., id. at 65.
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• Victim Services. Companies should provide financial support to vic-
tim services, women’s shelters, or community foundations that can
provide aid and assist in developing long term solutions to the prob-
lem of human trafficking in the area.
• Data Collection. Companies should support efforts to gather informa-
tion on the problem, both by providing financial assistance and by
sharing what information they are able to gather independently, ena-
bling the development of more precise, targeted solutions to the
region.
• Job Opportunities and Training. Several companies have sought to
combat trafficking by providing job training and job opportunities to
victims of human trafficking, removing the financial need that can
make re-victimization more likely.367
• Lobbying for Government Action. Recognizing the complexity of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and its contribution to the prob-
lem of human trafficking and sexual assault in Fort Berthold and other
reservations, companies should support groups working to expand tri-
bal criminal jurisdiction or to secure enforcement by the federal gov-
ernment. Recognizing the complexity of Indian law in the US, the far-
reaching consequences of any changes in tribal criminal jurisdiction,
and its distance from corporate interests and knowledge, companies
should support the tribes in this matter and not lobby for action
independently.
Adopting these practices is a minor investment for company stakeholders
that would not only considerably reduce investor risk, but also help move
toward a solution to the serious problem of human trafficking and sexual
assault on the Fort Berthold reservation.
V. CONCLUSION
In April 2013 the United States Geological Survey estimated that there
remain 4.4 to 11 billion barrels of technologically recoverable oil in the Bak-
ken and the nearby Three Forks Formations.368 The Bureau of Indian Affairs
at Fort Berthold estimates that another 1,000 wells will be drilled on the
reservation in the next ten years.369 These statistics signal the importance of
developing a comprehensive approach to end sex trafficking coincident with
oil and gas development in a timely manner. Without such an approach, the
safety and security of Native women and children will remain uncertain.
367 See, e.g., id. at 62–64.
368 Stephanie B. Gaswirth, et al., U.S. Geological Survey, Assessment of Undiscov-
ered Oil Resources in the Bakken and Three Forks Formations, Williston Basin Province,
Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota 4 (2013), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2013/3013/
fs2013-3013.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4VQ-WRBW].
369 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 37. R
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And the trauma of sex trafficking is not limited to the individual – the cul-
tural and social effects of sexual violence will leave a devastating legacy for
future generations.
The complex state of criminal jurisdiction on the Fort Berthold reserva-
tion increases the likelihood that sex trafficking will continue to be a hidden
crime unless all stakeholders – federal, state, tribal, and private – leverage
the opportunities available to them to decisively combat sex trafficking. The
Tribe has several mechanisms to increase their ability to enact anti-traffick-
ing measures and, with the assistance of federal and state partners, there are
opportunities for cross-deputization and partnership to greatly increase the
efficacy of law enforcement. Finally, private companies should adopt poli-
cies and best practices that adequately address the unique impacts of re-
source development on Indian lands. Only with a comprehensive approach
can the MHA Nation effectively protect Native women and children from
sex trafficking, and continue to responsibly develop its resources to the ben-
efit of the Nation.
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